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Abstract
As machine learning (ML) being applied to many mission-critical scenarios, certifying ML model robustness
becomes increasingly important. Many previous works focuses on the robustness of independent ML and
ensemble models, and can only certify a very small magnitude of the adversarial perturbation. In this
paper, we take a different viewpoint and improve learning robustness by going beyond independent ML and
ensemble models. We aim at promoting the generic Sensing-Reasoning machine learning pipeline which
contains both the sensing (e.g. deep neural networks) and reasoning (e.g. Markov logic networks (MLN))
components enriched with domain knowledge. Can domain knowledge help improve learning robustness?
Can we formally certify the end-to-end robustness of such an ML pipeline?
We first theoretically analyze the computational complexity of checking the provable robustness in
the reasoning component. We then derive the provable robustness bound for several concrete reasoning
components. We show that for reasoning components such as MLN and a specific family of Bayesian networks
it is possible to certify the robustness of the whole pipeline even with a large magnitude of perturbation
which cannot be certified by existing work. Finally, we conduct extensive real-world experiments on large
scale datasets to evaluate the certified robustness for Sensing-Reasoning ML pipelines.
1 Introduction
Building models that are robust to adversarial attacks is an important, emerging topic. However, most, if
not all, existing work focus on reasoning the robustness of an independent machine learning (ML) model or
model ensemble [KW17, TXT18, LZLX19, CRK19]. On the other hand, the predictions of ML models, when
applied in real-world scenarios, are often used by downstream programs to enable decision making or user
interaction. These downstream programs are often enriched with domain knowledge and are indispensable
components for modern ML. In this paper, we ask: can we reason about the robustness of an end-to-end ML
pipeline beyond a single ML model or ensemble?
In this paper, we focus on a generic type of ML pipelines that we call Sensing-Reasoning pipelines — given
a collection of input data, (1) the Sensing Phase contains a set of neural network models that output their
predictions as a set of Boolean random variables; and (2) the Reasoning Phase uses this set of Boolean random
variables in statistical inference models such as Markov logic networks or Bayesian networks to produce the
final output, which is a set of Boolean random variables. This pipeline is general and can be applied to a wide
range of applications such as reinforcement learning and information extraction [XGA+19, DDJ+14, PD07].
The process of the pipeline is illustrated in Figure 1. Given such a pipeline, our goal is to reason about the
∗The first two authors contribute equally to this work.
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Figure 1: An illustration of a sensing-reasoning pipeline in which the sensing component consists of three
different neural networks for the same image recognition task and the reasoning component is a factor graph.
The goal of this work is to rigorously reason about the robustness of the whole pipeline, given the perturbation
on the input. As we will see in this paper, the end-to-end pipeline might be more robust than each individual
neural network used for sensing, depending on the implemented reasoning logic.
following: During inference, given an η perturbation on the input X where ||η||p < CI , can we upper bound the
end-to-end maximal perturbation ||δ||p of the marginal probability of final output?
(Challenges and Opportunities) Compared with previous efforts focusing on (provable) robustness of
neural network models, the reasoning component brings its own challenges and opportunities. (Challenge)
Different from a neural network whose inference can be executed in polynomial time, many reasoning models
such as a Markov logic network can be #P-complete for inference. (Opportunity) However, as many reasoning
models define a probability distribution in the exponential family, we have more functional structures that
could potentially make coming up with robustness guarantees (which essentially solves a min-max problem)
easier. In this paper, we provide the first treatment to this problem characterized by these unique challenges and
opportunities.
(Scope and Summary of Technical Results) As one of the first efforts in tackling this problem, this paper
by no means provides a complete solution. Instead, we scope our technical endeavors to provable robustness
bounds for two types of reasoning components: (1) Markov logic networks and (2) Bayesian networks, while
the robustness of the sensing component relies on existing work on robustness of independent ML or ensemble
models. Specifically, we aim to answer the following three questions and make corresponding contributions.
Is checking provable robustness in the reasoning component feasible when the inference of the reason-
ing component is #P-hard? We first focus on the computational complexity of checking provable robustness
in the reasoning component. We reduce the problem of counting in statistical inference to the problem of
checking provable robustness. Therefore, checking provable robustness is no easier than counting on the same
family of distribution. When the reasoning component is a graphical model such as Markov logic network,
checking provable robustness is no easier than calculating the partition function of the underlying graphical
model, which is #P-hard in general.
Can we efficiently reason about the provable robustness for the Reasoning component when given an
oracle for statistical inference? Even when statistical inference can be done by a given oracle, it is not
immediately clear how to come up with an efficient algorithm for provable robustness. Our second technical
contribution is to develop such an algorithm for Markov logic network and a specific family of Bayesian
networks. Surprisingly, providing provable robustness for these problems are possible because of the structure
inherent in the probabilistic graphical models and distributions in the exponential family. In addition, some
of our techniques also apply to models beyond traditional statistical inference models. For example, when
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the reasoning component is a 1-NN classifier, we can also use a similar technique to derive a tight provable
robustness bound for it. This, however, is not the main focus of this work and we leave it to the Appendix.
Does our algorithm provide practically provable robustness bound for certain Sensing-Reasoning
pipelines? We test our algorithms on multiple Sensing-Reasoning pipelines. One common characteristic of
these pipelines is that they all have state-of-the-art deep neural networks as the sensing component and a
graphical model enriched by domain-knowledge as the reasoning component. We construct these pipelines to
cover a range of applications in image processing and natural language processing. In many cases, reasoning
about the end-to-end robustness provides a stronger guarantee than what a single model in the sensing
component can provide because of the logic implemented in the reasoning component. In addition, existing
work on certifying the robustness of single a ML sensing model is found to be vulnerable given the fact that
the certified result may not be the ground truth [JBC+19]. While with domain knowledge, it is often possible
to increase the chance that the certified result of the Sensing-Reasoning pipeline remains the ground truth.
Contributions. We now summarize our key contributions.
• We provide formal analysis for the end-to-end robustness of generic Sensing-Reasoning machine learning
pipelines.
• We in particular analyze the hardness for the reasoning component and prove the hardness for general
distribution, Markov logic networks, and Bayesian Networks.
• Given an oracle for statistical inference, we theoretically certify the end-to-end robustness for the
pipeline. We show that for certain types of pipelines our bound is tight (e.g. Bayesian networks).
• Compared with existing certified robustness methods, with a sensing-reasoning pipeline, we can often
increase chance that the certified prediction to be the ground truth with domain knowledge.
• We verify our end-to-end certified robustness with several real-world applications, including OCR based
arithmetic equation recognition (computer vision) and information extraction with stocks news (natural
language processing). Extensive experimental results show that with Sensing-Reasoning pipelines, the
certified robustness can be improved significantly compared with existing independent ML or ensemble
models.
2 Related Work
This paper is compatible with two lines of work: the robustness for a single ML models or ensemble, and joint
inference with domain knowledge enabled by statistical inference.
Robustness for Single ML model and Ensemble Lots of efforts have been made so far to improve the
robustness of single ML or ensemble models. Adversarial training [GSS15] and its variations [TKP+18,
MMS+17, XDL+18] have generally been more successful in practice, but usually come at the cost of accuracy
and increased training time [TSE+18]. To further provide certifiable robustness guarantees for ML models,
various certifiable defenses and robustness verification approaches have been proposed [KW17, TXT18,
CRK19]. Among these strategies, randomized smoothing [CRK19] has achieved scalable performance. With
improvements on training including pretraining and adversarial training, the provable robustness bound
can be further improved [CRS+19, SLR+19]. In addition to the single ML model, several work proposed to
promote the diversity of classifiers and therefore develop a robust ensemble [PXD+19]. Although promising,
these defense approaches, either empirical or theoretical, can only improve the robustness of a single ML
model. On one hand, certifying or improving the robustness of such single or pure ensemble models is very
challenging given that there is no additional information that can be utilized. On the other hand, in practice
the ML learning process usually favors a pipeline which is able to incorporate different sensing components as
well as domain knowledge together. Thus, certifying the robustness of such pipeline is of great importance.
Robustness of End-to-end Systems There has been intensive study on how joint inference between
multiple models and predictions within an end-to-end pipeline can help to improve their specific accu-
racy [XGA+19, DDJ+14, PD07, McC09, CFM+14, CFCM14] and have been applied to a range of real-world
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applications [BFE11, PZLR14, MZRA15]. Often, these approaches use different statistical inference models
such as factor graphs [WJ08], Markov logic networks [RD06], Bayesian networks [Pea00] as a way to
integrate knowledge. In this paper, we take a different perspective on this problem — instead of treating
joint inference as a way to improve the application accuracy, we explore the possibility of using it as a way to
improve the end-to-end model robustness. As we will see in this paper, by integrating domain knowledge, we
are able to improve the robustness of the ML pipeline significantly. Another line of work tries to analyze the
robustness of end-to-end systems with ML components based on their temporal logic properties [DDS19].
However, to our best knowledge, there is no domain knowledge enhanced robustness can be improved or
certified in these work.
3 Sensing-Reasoning Pipelines and End-to-end Robustness
In this paper, we focus on a specific type of ML pipelines that we call the Sensing-Reasoning pipelines. This
specific type of pipelines provides a natural way to combine predictive models based on statistical features
(e.g., a neural network) and domain knowledge, which enables it to model a range of applications from both
computer science [XGA+19, DDJ+14, PD07, ZRC+17] and domain sciences [BFE11, PZLR14, MZRA15].
In this section, we first formally define the Sensing-Reasoning pipeline and its end-to-end robustness.
Such a pipeline can be instantiated by different statistical inference models such as Markov logic networks
(MLN) [RD06], Bayesian networks (BN) [Pea00], or general factor graphs. We will describe the specific
instantiation using MLNs and leave the results of BN and other models to Section 6 and Appendix.
3.1 Sensing-Reasoning Pipelines
We formally define a Sensing-Reasoning pipeline and illustrate how it can be used to model state-of-the-art
tasks.
A Sensing-Reasoning pipeline contains a set of n sensors {Si}i∈[n] and a reasoning component R. Each
sensor is a binary classifier (for multi-class classifier it corresponds to a group of sensors) — given an input
data example X, each of the sensor Si outputs a probability pi(X) (i.e., if Si is a neural network, pi(X)
represents its output after the final softmax layer). The reasoning component takes the outputs of all sensing
models as its inputs, and outputs a new Boolean random variable R({pi(X)}i∈[n]).
One natural choice of the reasoning component is to use a probabilistic graphical model. In the next
subsection, we will make the reasoning component R more concrete by instantiating it as a Markov logic
network. The output of a Sensing-Reasoning pipeline on the input data example X is the expectation of the
random variable R:
E[R({pi(X)}i∈[n])].
Example. Despite of its simplicity, a Sensing-Reasoning pipeline provides a generic and principled way of
integrating domain knowledge with the output of statistical predictive models such as neural networks. One
such example is [DDJ+14] for the task of ImageNet classification. Here each sensing model corresponds to
the classifier for one specific class in ImageNet, e.g., Sdog(X) and Sanimal(X). The reasoning component in
this specific example outputs a Boolean random variable for each specific class. The reasoning component
then encodes domain knowledge such that “If an image is classified as a dog then it must also be classified as an
animal” using a probabilistic graphical model. Figure 2 illustrates a similar Sensing-Reasoning pipeline. We
see pipelines of similar structures in a range of other applications [PD07, BFE11, PZLR14, MZRA15].
3.2 End-to-end Robustness
Given a Sensing-Reasoning pipeline with n sensors {Si}i∈[n] and a reasoning component R, we will first
formally define its end-to-end robustness and then analyze the robustness for each component respectively.
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Figure 2: An illustration of a Sensing-Reasoning pipeline instantiated with Markov logic networks, implement-
ing the logic similar to [DDJ+14]. In this case, the reasoning component is a grounded MLN represented as a
factor graph. There is no interior variable (See Section 3.3) in this specific example.
Definition 1 ((CI , CE , p)-robustness). A Sensing-Reasoning pipeline with n sensors {Si}i∈[n] and a reasoning
component R is (CI , CE , p)-robust on the input X if for the input perturbation η, ||η||p ≤ CI implies∣∣E[R({pi(X)}i∈[n])]− E[R({pi(X + η)}i∈[n])]∣∣ ≤ CE .
That is, a perturbation ||η||p < CI on the input only change the final output of this pipeline by at most CE .
Sensing Robustness and Reasoning Robustness. We decompose the end-to-end robustness into two
components. The first component, which we call the sensing robustness, has been studied by the research
community recently [KW17, TXT18, CRK19] — given a perturbation ||η||p < CI on the input X, we say each
sensor Si is (CI , CS , p)-robust if
∀η, ||η||p ≤ CI =⇒ |pi(X)− pi(X + η)| ≤ CS
The robustness of the reasoning component is defined as follows. Given a perturbation |i| < CS on the
output of each sensor Si(X), we say that the reasoning component R is (CS , CE)-robust if
∀1, ..., n, (∀i. |i| ≤ CS) =⇒∣∣E[R({pi(X)}i∈[n])]− E[R({pi(X) + i}i∈[n])]∣∣ ≤ CE .
It is easy to see that when the sensing component is (CI , CS , p)-robust and the reasoning component is
(CS , CE)-robust on X, the end-to-end pipeline is (CI , CE , p)-robust. Since the sensing robustness has been
intensive studied by previous work, in this paper, we mainly focus on the reasoning robustness and therefore
analyzing the robustness of the pipeline.
3.3 Reasoning Component as Markov Logic Networks
Given the generic definition of a Sensing-Reasoning pipeline, one can use different models to implement the
reasoning components. In this section, we focus on one natural choice — Markov logic networks (MLN),
which is a popular way to define a probabilistic graphical model using first-order logic [RD06]. We discuss
other models such as Bayesian networks in Section 6.
We now formally define the reasoning component implemented as a Markov logic network. Markov logic
network contains a set of weighted first-order logic sentences, as illustrated in Figure 2(b). After grounding,
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an MLN defines a joint probabilistic distribution among a collection of random variables, as illustrated in
Figure 2(c).
We adapt the standard MLN semantics to a Sensing-Reasoning pipeline and use a slightly more general
variant compared with the original MLN [RD06]. Each MLN program corresponds to an factor graph — Due
to the space limitation, we will not discuss the grounding part and point the readers to [RD06]. Instead, we
focus on defining the result after grounding, i.e., the factor graph.
Specifically, a grounded MLN is a factor graph G = (V,F). V is a set of Boolean random variables. Specific
to a Sensing-Reasoning pipeline, there are two types of random variables V = X ∪ Y:
1. Interface Variables X = {xi}i∈[n]: Each sensing model Si corresponds to one interface variable xi in
the grounded factor graph;
2. Interior variables Y = {yi}i∈[m] are other variables introduced by the MLN model.
Each factor F ∈ F contains a weight wF and a factor function fF defined over a subset of variables v¯F ⊆ V
that returns {0, 1}. There are two sets of factors F = G ∪ H:
1. Interface Factors G: For each interface variable xi, we create one interface factor Gi with weight
wGi = log[pi(X)/(1− pi(X))] and factor function fGi(a) = I[a = 1] defined over v¯fGi = {xi}.
2. Interior Factors H are other factors introduced by the MLN program.
Remark: MLN-specific Structure. Our result applies to more general family of factor graphs and are not
necessarily specific to those grounded by MLNs. However, MLN provides an intuitive way of grounding such a
factor graph with domain knowledge. Moreover, factor graphs grounded by MLNs have certain properties
enforced that we will use later, e.g., all factors only return non-negative values and there are no unusual
weight sharing structures.
The above factor graph defines a joint probability distribution among all variables V. We define a possible
world as a function σ : V 7→ {0, 1} that corresponds to one possible assignment of values to each random
variable. Let Σ be the set of all (exponentially many) possible worlds.
In this paper, the output of a reasoning component implemented using MLNs is the marginal probability of
a given variable v ∈ V:
E[RMLN ({pi(X)}i∈[n])] = Pr [v = 1]
=Z1({pi(X)}i∈[n])/Z2({pi(X)}i∈[n])
where the partition functions Z1 and Z2 are defined as
Z1({pi(X)}i∈[n])
=
∑
σ∈Σ∧σ(v)=1
exp
∑
Gi∈G
wGiσ(xi) +
∑
H∈H
wHfH(σ(v¯H))

and
Z2({pi(X)}i∈[n])
=
∑
σ∈Σ
exp
∑
Gi∈G
wGiσ(xi) +
∑
H∈H
wHfH(σ(v¯H))

Why wGi = log[pi(X)/(1− pi(X))]? When the MLN does not introduce any interior variables and interior
factors, it is easy to see that setting wGi = log[pi(X)/(1 − pi(X))] ensures that the marginal probability of
each interface variable equals to the output of the original sensing model pi(X). This means that if we do not
have additional knowledge in the reasoning component, the pipeline outputs the same distribution as the
original sensing component.
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Learning Weights for Interior Factors? In this paper, we view all weights for interior factors as hyperpa-
rameters. These weights can be learned by maximizing the likelihood using weight learning algorithms for
MLNs [LD07].
Beyond Marginal Probability for a Single Variable. We have assumed that the output of a Sensing-
Reasoning pipeline is the marginal probability distribution of a given random variable in the grounded factor
graph. However, our result can be more general — given a function over possible worlds and outputs {0, 1},
the output of a pipeline can be the marginal probability of such a function. This will not change the algorithm
that we propose later.
4 Hardness of Reasoning Robustness
Given a reasoning component R, how hard is it to reason about its robustness? In this section, we aim at
understanding this fundamental question. Specifically, we present the hardness results of determining the
robustness of the reasoning component. We start by defining the counting and robustness problems on a
general distribution. We prove that counting can be reduced to checking for reasoning robustness and hence
the latter is at least as hard. We then use this hardness result to prove complexities of reasoning robustness
in specific distributions. We present the hardness result about MLN in this section and leave the result for
Bayesian Networks to Appendix .
4.1 General distribution
Let X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} be a set of variables. Let piα be a distribution over D[n] defined by a set of parameters
α ∈ P [m], whereD is the domain of variables, either discrete or continuous, and P is the domain of parameters.
We call pi accessible if for any σ ∈ D[n], piα(σ) ∝ w(σ;α), where w : D[n] × P [m] → R≥0 is a polynomial-time
computable function. We will restrict our attention to accessible distributions only. We use Q : D[n] → {0, 1}
to denote a Boolean query, which is a polynomial-time computable function. We define the following two
oracles:
Definition 2 (COUNTING). Given input polynomial-time computable weight function w(·) and query function
Q(·), parameters α, a real number εc > 0, a COUNTING oracle outputs a real number Z such that
1− εc ≤ Z
Eσ∼piα [Q(σ)]
≤ 1 + εc.
Definition 3 (ROBUSTNESS). Given input polynomial-time computable weight function w(·) and query
function Q(·), parameters α, two real numbers  > 0 and δ > 0, a ROBUSTNESS oracle decides, for any
α′ ∈ P [m] such that ‖α− α′‖∞ ≤ , whether the following is true:∣∣Eσ∼piα [Q(σ)]−Eσ∼piα′ [Q(σ)]∣∣ < δ.
We can prove that ROBUSTNESS is at least as hard as COUNTING by a reduction argument.
Theorem 4 (COUNTING ≤t ROBUSTNESS). Given polynomial-time computable weight function w(·) and query
function Q(·), parameters α and real number εc > 0, the instance of COUNTING, (w,Q, α, εc) can be determined
by up to O(1/ε2c) queries of the ROBUSTNESS oracle with input perturbation  = O(εc).
Proof-sketch. We define the partition function Zi :=
∑
σ:Q(σ)=i w(σ;α) and Eσ∼piα [Q(σ)] = Z1/(Z0 +
Z1). We then construct a new weight function t(σ;α) := w(σ;α) exp(βQ(σ)) by introducing an additional
parameter β, such that τβ(σ) ∝ t(σ;β), and Eσ∼τβ [Q(σ)] = e
βZ1
Z0+eβZ1
. Then we consider the perturbation
β′ = β ± , with  = O(εc) and query the ROBUSTNESS oracle with input (t, Q, β, , δ) multiple times to
perform a binary search in δ to estimate
∣∣∣Eσ∼piβ [Q(σ)]−Eσ∼piβ′ [Q(σ)]∣∣∣. Perform a further “outer” binary
search to find the β which maximizes the perturbation. This yields a good estimator for log Z0Z1 which in turn
gives Eσ∼piα [Q(σ)] with εc multiplicative error. We leave proof to Appendix.
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4.2 Markov Logic Networks
Given Theorem A.1, we can now state the following result specifically for MLNs:
Theorem 5 (MLN Hardness). Given an MLN whose grounded factor graph is G = (V,F) in which the weights
for interface factors are wGi = log pi(X)/(1− pi(X)) and constant thresholds δ, C, deciding whether
∀{i}i∈[n] (∀i. |i| < C) =⇒∣∣ERMLN ({pi(X)}i∈[n])− ERMLN ({pi(X) + i}i∈[n])∣∣ < δ
is as hard as estimating ERMLN ({pi(X)}i∈[n]) up to εc multiplicative error, with i = O(εc).
Proof. Let α = [pi(X)], query function Q(.) = RMLN (.) and piα defined by the marginal distribution over
interior variables of MLN. Theorem A.1 directly implies that O(1/ε2c) queries of a ROBUSTNESS oracle can be
used to efficiently estimate ERMLN ({pi(X)}i∈[n]).
In general, statistical inference in general MLNs are #P-complete. As a result, checking robustness for general
MLNs is also #P-hard.
5 Robustness of Markov Logic Networks
Although statistical inference for general MLNs are #P-complete, in practice, there are multiple ways to
accommodate this problem: (1) when the factor graph is of small tree-width, one can apply exact inference
algorithms [WJ08]; (2) one can construct the MLN program such that exact statistical inference is feasible;
and (3) there exists a range of approximate inference algorithms for MLN inference.[SD08]
In this paper, we assume that we have access to an exact oracle for statistical inference, and provide a
novel algorithm to upper bound the reasoning robustness. I.e., we assume that we are able to calculate the
two partition functions Z1({pi(X)}i∈[n]) and Z2({pi(X)}i∈[n]) efficiently.
Lemma 6 (MLN Robustness). Given access to partition functions Z1({pi(X)}i∈[n]) and Z2({pi(X)}i∈[n]), and
a maximum perturbation C, ∀1, ..., n, if ∀i. |i| < C, we have that ∀λ1, ..., λn ∈ R,
max
{|i|<C}
lnE[RMLN ({pi(X) + i}i∈[n])]
≤ max
{|i|<C}
Z˜1({i}i∈[n])− min{|′i|<C}
Z˜2({′i}i∈[n])
min
{|i|<C}
lnE[RMLN ({pi(X) + i}i∈[n])]
≥ min
{|i|<C}
Z˜1({i}i∈[n])− max{|′i|<C}
Z˜2({′i}i∈[n])
where
Z˜r({i}i∈[n]) = lnZr({pi(X) + i}i∈[n]) +
∑
i
λii.
We leave the proof to the Appendix, where we also present further analysis of the structure of Z˜r:
1. When λi ≥ 0, Z˜r({i}i∈[n]) monotonically increases w.r.t. i; Thus, the maximal is achieved at i = C
and the minimal is achieved at i = −C. When λi ≤ −1, Z˜r({i}i∈[n]) monotonically decreases w.r.t. i;
Thus, the maximal is achieved at i = −C and the minimal is achieved at i = C.
2. When λi ∈ (−1, 0), the maximal is achieved at i ∈ {−C,C}, and the minimal is achieved at i ∈
{−C,C} or at the zero gradient of Z˜r({˜i}i∈[n]) with respect to ˜i = log
[
(1−pi(X))(pi(X)+i)
pi(X)(1−pi(X)−i)
]
, due to
the convexity of Z˜r({˜i}i∈[n]) in ˜i,∀i.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithms for upper bound MLN robustness (algorithm of lower bound is similar)
input : Oracles calculating Z˜1 and Z˜2; maximal perturbation C.
output : An upper bound for input RMLN ({pi(X) + i})
1: Rmin ← 1
2: initialize λ
3: for b ∈ search budgets do
4: λ→ update({λ};λi ∈ (−∞,−1] ∪ [0,+∞))
5: for i = 1 to n do
6: if λi ≥ 0 then
7: i = C, ′i = −C
8: else if λi ≤ −1 then
9: i = −C, ′i = C
10: end if
11: R← Z˜1({i}i∈[n])− Z˜2({′i}i∈[n])
12: Rmin ← min(Rmin, R)
13: end for
14: end for
15: return Rmin
As a result, given any {λi}i∈[n], we can calculate an upper bound for RMLN . Similarly, we are able to lower
bound RMLN using the same technique.
Algorithm. Algorithm 1 illustrates an algorithm based on the above result to upper bound the robustness
of MLN. The main step is to explore different regimes of the {λi}. In this paper, we only explore regimes
where λ ∈ (−∞,−1]∪ [0,+∞) as this already provides reasonable solutions in our experiments. The function
update({λi}) defines the exploration strategy — Depending on the scale of the problem, one can explore
{λi} using grid search, random sampling, or even gradient-based methods. For experiments in this paper,
we use either grid search or random sampling. It is an exciting future direction to understand other efficient
exploration strategies.
Discussion: Comparing with Provable Robustness for Deep Neural Networks. At the first glance,
the above algorithm can be “unintuitively” simple, especially given that it is solving a similar optimization
problem as the provable robustness problem for deep neural networks which is still challenging. Why is it
simpler to provide provable robustness guarantees for the reasoning component than deep neural networks? The
fundamental reason lies in the structure of the reasoning component — With a range of properties (e.g., all
variables and factors can only output non-negative values; the distribution is in exponential families with
limited weight sharing), the reasoning component enjoys some monotonic properties that one cannot find
in deep neural networks. Moreover, these properties hold for general Markov logic networks — this makes us
believe that a Sensing-Reasoning pipeline provides a unique opportunity for us to further improve the robustness
of ML applications by integrating domain knowledge, especially given that the robustness of a single ML model or
ensemble can be much harder to certify in general.
6 Beyond Markov Logic Networks
Apart from MLNs, we are able to reason about the robustness for a range of other reasoning component. Due
to space limitation, we summarize these results here and leave the details to the Appendix.
1. For Bayesian networks with tree structures, we can provide a similar reduction from counting to
robustness.
2. For Bayesian networks with binary tree structure, we are able to derive an efficient algorithm to provide
the tight upper and lower bounds of reasoning robustness.
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Table 1: End-to-end accuracy and certification ratio between different approaches under different perturba-
tions.
(a) (OCR) Attack all sensing models
With knowledge Without knowledge
 E2E accuracy Cert. Ratio E2E accuracy Cert. Ratio
0.1 0.9333 0.9667 0.4333 0.4333
0.2 0.7333 0.7667 0.0000 0.0000
0.3 0.6667 0.7000 0.0000 0.0000
0.5 0.2667 0.3000 0.0000 0.0000
0.9 0.2667 0.3000 0.0000 0.0000
(b) (OCR) Attack 30% sensing models
With knowledge Without knowledge
 E2E accuracy Cert. Ratio E2E accuracy Cert. Ratio
0.1 0.8667 0.9111 0.4222 0.4222
0.2 0.7556 0.8222 0.0000 0.0000
0.3 0.6889 0.7778 0.0000 0.0000
0.5 0.4889 0.5556 0.0000 0.0000
0.9 0.1778 0.2000 0.0000 0.0000
(c) (NLP) Attack all sensing models
With knowledge Without knowledge
 E2E accuracy Cert. Ratio E2E accuracy Cert. Ratio
0.1 1.000 1.000 0.9969 0.9969
0.5 1.000 1.000 0.9474 0.9474
0.9 0.5882 0.5882 0.3839 0.3839
3. We can also extend our result beyond MLNs and Bayesian networks. For example, if the reasoning
component is a 1-NN classifier and if the the sensing output corresponds to the probability of a single
training point exists in the training set, we are able to derive tight upper and lower bounds of reasoning
robustness.
7 Experiments
To certify the end-to-end robustness of Sensing-Reasoning pipelines, we conduct a set of experiments on
different datasets and ML tasks including the OCR based arithmetic equation recognition and information
extraction with stocks news. We mainly demonstrate that: (1) with domain knowledge the Sensing-Reasoning
pipelines can improve the performance of single ML sending model even without input perturbation; (2)
considering different ratios of sensing models to be attacked (including the scenario when all sensing models
are attacked) with different perturbation magnitude, the certified robustness bound of sensing-reasoning is
much higher learning robustness than ML models learning without domain knowledge; (3) under different
input perturbation, our certified robustness bound is relatively tight in practice.
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Figure 3: (OCR) Histogram of the difference between the probability of the correct class (lower bound) and
the top wrong class (upper bound) under perturbation. If such a difference is positive, it means that the
classifier makes the right prediction under perturbation.
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Figure 4: (NLP) Histogram of the difference between the probability of the correct class (lower bound) and
the top wrong class (upper bound) under perturbation. If such a difference is positive, it means that the
classifier makes the right prediction under perturbation.
7.1 OCR Recognition
We collect the OCR dataset from a Korea arithmetic elementary book by extracting the equations manually.
We obtain 114 valid samples by utilizing Tesseract OCR [Smi07] for each equation sample. The outputs of
tesseract OCR contain several bounding boxes together with the corresponding confidence of the highest
priority / alternative character level choices. We only keep the top-2 highest confidence character level choices
for each position.
To evaluate the robustness of the Sensing-Reasoning pipeline, we select the data samples whose top-1
choices given by the OCR engine in all positions are correct to make sure that the perturbation induces actual
“attacks”. We use α to represent the ratio of the sensing models that can be attacked, and  the perturbation
added to each sensing model. When α = 1 which means that all the sensing models could be attacked, we
select equations with length smaller or equal to 5. We add random noise to these instances to simulate the
real-world scenarios and obtain 105 data samples in total.
To implement the Sensing-Reasoning pipeline, we define the possible worlds of the MLN reasoning
component as the output equation, and the rules correspond to the correctness of the equations. We set the
weight of the interior factor as wH = 20. During the attack phase, we add perturbation on all the random
selected α portion of sensing model’s top-1 confidence value p by  ∈ [0, C] and project them to the feasible
range such that: p′ = clip(p − , 10−5, 1 − 10−5). During the robustness evaluation phase, we evaluate the
character level accuracy on the attacked positions and compared the robustness of scenarios with and without
knowledge.
First, without performing any attack, the accuracy of the Sensing-Reasoning pipeline is about 10% higher
compared with the vanilla OCR engines (detailed results in appendix). As shown in Table 5 (a), even if all the
sensing models are attacked, the certified robustness of the Sensing-Reasoning pipeline remain as high as
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0.76 when the perturbation  = 0.2; when  > 0.2 both the accuracy and certified robustness of vanilla OCR
drop to 0 while the pipeline can still preserve reasonable utilities. Similar observations an be drawn when
partial sensing models are attacked with different perturbation  (Table 5 (b)).
In addition, to further understand the mechanism of robustness, we calculate the “margin” — the difference
between the probability of the correct class (lower bound) and top wrong class (upper bound) under different
perturbation — to inspect the robustness certification (larger difference infer stronger certification). From
Figure 3, it is clear that under different attacks, the Sending-Reasoning pipeline usually obtain large positive
margin meaning it is able to certify the robustness with larger confidence while making sure the certified
result is the ground truth which is challenging for current provable robustness approaches. More attack
settings with different α and  are shown in the appendix and similar trends are observed.
7.2 Information Extraction of Stock News
We also conduct an information extraction task in NLP based on a stock news dataset — HighTech dataset
which consists of both daily closing asset price and financial news from 2006 to 2013 [DZLD14]. We choose
9 companies which obtain the most news, resulting in 4810 articles related to 9 stocks filtered by company
name. We split the dataset into training and testing days chronologically. We define three information
extraction tasks on the following relations: StockPrice(Day, Company, Price), StockPriceChange(Day,
Company, Percent), StockPriceGain(Day, Company). We leave detailed definitions of these relations to
Appendix. The domain knowledge that we integrate depicts the relationships between these relations, and we
leave the details also to Appendix.
As shown in Table 5 (c) and Figure 4, similar conclusions can be drawn — the Sensing-Reasoning pipeline
not only can improve the benign accuracy compared with the vanilla sensing models, but also provide
significantly higher certified end-to-end robustness even under strong attacks.
Conclusion In this paper we provide the first certifiable end-to-end robustness analysis for the Sensing-
Reasoning pipeline. Our theoretic and empirical analysis would shed light on future research towards
improving and certifying robustness for general ML models.
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A Hardness of General Distribution
We first recall that the following definitions:
Counting. Given input polynomial-time computable weight function w(·) and query function Q(·), parameters
α, a real number εc > 0, a COUNTING oracle outputs a real number Z such that
1− εc ≤ Z
Eσ∼piα [Q(σ)]
≤ 1 + εc.
Robustness. Given input polynomial-time computable weight function w(·) and query function Q(·), pa-
rameters α, two real numbers  > 0 and δ > 0, a ROBUSTNESS oracle decides, for any α′ ∈ P [m] such that
‖α− α′‖∞ ≤ , whether the following is true:∣∣Eσ∼piα [Q(σ)]−Eσ∼piα′ [Q(σ)]∣∣ < δ.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4 (COUNTING ≤t ROBUSTNESS). Given polynomial-time computable weight function w(·) and
query function Q(·), parameters α and real number εc > 0, the instance of COUNTING, (w,Q, α, εc) can be
determined by up to O(1/ε2c) queries of the ROBUSTNESS oracle with input perturbation  = O(εc).
Proof. Let (w,Q, α, εc) be an instance of COUNTING. Define a new distribution τβ over X with a single
parameter β ∈ R such that τβ(σ) ∝ t(σ;β), where t(σ;β) = w(σ;α) exp(βQ(σ)). Since Q is polynomial-time
computable, τβ is accessible for any β. We will choose β later. For i ∈ {0, 1}, define Zi :=
∑
σ:Q(σ)=i w(σ;α).
Then we have
Eσ∼piα [Q(σ)] =
Z1
Z0 + Z1
,
Eσ∼τβ [Q(σ)] =
eβZ1
Z0 + eβZ1
.
We further define
Y +(β, x) := Eσ∼τβ+x [Q(σ)]−Eσ∼τβ [Q(σ)]
=
exeβZ1
Z0 + exeβZ1
− e
βZ1
Z0 + eβZ1
=
(ex − 1)eβZ0Z1
(Z0 + exeβZ1)(Z0 + eβZ1)
=
(ex − 1)eβ
R+ (ex + 1)eβ + e
xe2β
R
,
where R := Z0Z1 , and similarly
Y −(β, x) := Eσ∼τβ [Q(σ)]−Eσ∼τβ−x [Q(σ)]
=
eβZ1
Z0 + eβZ1
− e
−xeβZ1
Z0 + e−xeβZ1
=
(1− e−x)eβZ0Z1
(Z0 + e−xeβZ1)(Z0 + eβZ1)
=
(ex − 1)eβ
exR+ (ex + 1)eβ + e
2β
R
.
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Easy calculation implies that for x > 0, Y +(β, x) > Y −(β, x) if and only if R > eβ . Note that
Y +(β, x) =
ex − 1
Re−β + ex + 1 + ex+βR
≤ e
x/2 − 1
ex/2 + 1
;
Y −(β, x) =
ex − 1
Rex−β + ex + 1 + eβR
≤ e
x/2 − 1
ex/2 + 1
.
The two maximum are achieved when R = eβ±x/2. We will choose x = O(εc). Define
Y (β) := max{Y +(β, x), Y −(β, x)} =

ex−1
Re−β+ex+1+ ex+βR
if eβ < R;
ex−1
Rex−β+ex+1+ eβR
if eβ ≥ R.
This function Y is increasing in [0, logR− x/2], decreasing in [logR− x/2, logR], increasing in [logR, logR+
x/2] again, and decreasing in [logR+ x/2,∞) once again.
Our goal is to estimate R. For any fixed β, we will query the ROBUSTNESS oracle with parameters
(t, Q, β, x, δ). Using binary search in δ, we can estimate the function Y (β) above efficiently with additive
error ε′c with at most O(log
1
ε′c
) oracle calls. We use binary search once again in β so that it stops only
if Y (β0) ≥ ex/2−1ex/2+1 − ε0 for some β0 and the accuracy ε0 ≤ e
x/2−1
2(ex/2+1)
is to be fixed later. In particular,
Y (β0) ≥ ex/2−12(ex/2+1) . Note that here ε0 is the accumulated error from binary searching twice.
We claim that β0 is a good estimators to logR. First assume that eβ0 < R, which implies that
ex/2 − 1
ex/2 + 1
− Y (β0) = e
x/2 − 1
ex/2 + 1
− e
x − 1
Re−β0 + ex + 1 + e
x+β0
R
=
(ex − 1)
(ex/2 + 1)2(Re−β0 + ex + 1 + e
x+β0
R )
(√
Re−β0 −
√
ex+β0
R
)2
=
Y (β0)
(ex/2 + 1)2
(√
Re−β0 −
√
ex+β0
R
)2
≤ ε0.
Thus, ∣∣∣∣∣√Re−β0 −
√
ex+β0
R
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
2ε0(ex/2 + 1)3
ex/2 − 1 .
Let ρ := Re−β0 . Note that ρ > 1. We choose ε0 := 12
(
ex/2−1
ex/2+1
)3
. Then
∣∣∣√ρ−√ex/ρ∣∣∣ < ex/2 − 1. If ρ ≥ ex,
then
∣∣∣√ρ−√ex/ρ∣∣∣ ≥ ex/2 − 1, a contradiction. Thus, ρ < ex. It implies that 1 < Reβ0 < ex. Similarly for the
case of eβ0 > R, we have that e−x < R
eβ0
< 1. Thus in both cases, we have our estimator
e−x <
R
eβ0
< ex.
Finally, to estimate Eσ∼piα [Q(σ)] =
1
1+R with multiplicative error εc, we only need to pick x := log(1 + εc) =
O(εc).
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B Robustness of MLN
B.1 Lagrange multipliers
Before proving the robustness result of MLN, we first briefly review the technique of Lagrange multipliers for
constrained optimization: Consider following problem P,
P: max
x1,x2
f(x1) + g(x2), s.t., x1 = x2, h(x1), k(x2) ≥ 0.
Introducing another real variable λ, we define the following problem P’,
P’: max
x1,x2
f(x1) + g(x2) + λ(x1 − x2), s.t., h(x1), k(x2) ≥ 0.
For all λ, let (x∗1, x
∗
2) be the solution of P and let (x¯1, x¯2) be the solution of P’, we have
f(x∗1) + g(x
∗
2) ≤ f(x∗1) + g(x∗2) + λ(x∗1 − x∗2) ≤ f(x¯1) + g(x¯2) + λ(x¯1 − x¯2)
B.2 Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 6 (MLN Robustness). Given access to partition functions Z1({pi(X)}i∈[n]) and Z2({pi(X)}i∈[n]), and
a maximum perturbation C, ∀1, ..., n, if ∀i. |i| < C, we have that ∀λ1, ..., λn ∈ R,
max
{|i<C|}
lnE[RMLN ({pi(X) + i}i∈[n])]
≤ max
{|i|<C}
Z˜1({i}i∈[n])− min{|′i|<C}
Z˜2({′i}i∈[n])
min
{|i<C|}
lnE[RMLN ({pi(X) + i}i∈[n])]
≥ min
{|i|<C}
Z˜1({i}i∈[n])− max{|′i|<C}
Z˜2({′i}i∈[n])
where
Z˜r({i}i∈[n]) = lnZr({pi(X) + i}i∈[n]) +
∑
i
λii.
Proof. Consider the upper bound, we have
max
{|i<C|}
lnE[RMLN ({pi(X) + i}i∈[n])]
= max
{|i<C|}
ln
(
Z1({pi(X) + i}i∈[n])
Z2({pi(X) + i}i∈[n])
)
= max
{i},{′i}
lnZ1({pi(X) + i}i∈[n])− lnZ2({pi(X) + ′i}i∈[n])
s.t., i = 
′
i, |i|, |′i| ≤ C.
Introducing Lagrange multipliers {λi}. Note that any choice of {λi} corresponds to a valid upper bound. Thus
∀λ1, ..., λn ∈ R, we can reformulate the above into
max
{|i<C|}
lnE[RMLN ({pi(X) + i}i∈[n])]
≤ max
{i},{′i}
lnZ1({pi(X) + i}i∈[n])− lnZ2({pi(X) + ′i}i∈[n]) +
∑
i
λi(i − ′i),
s.t., |i|, |′i| ≤ C.
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Define
Z˜1({i}i∈[n]) = lnZ1({pi(X) + i}i∈[n]) +
∑
i
λii.
Z˜2({′i}i∈[n]) = lnZ1({pi(X) + ′i}i∈[n]) +
∑
i
λi
′
i,
We have the claimed upper-bound,
max
{|i<C|}
lnE[RMLN ({pi(X) + i}i∈[n])] ≤ max{|i|<C} Z˜1({i}i∈[n])− min{|′i|<C}
Z˜2({′i}i∈[n]).
Similarly, the lower-bound can be written in terms of Lagrange multipliers, and ∀λ1, ..., λn ∈ R, we have
min
{|i<C|}
lnE[RMLN ({pi(X) + i}i∈[n])]
≥ min
{i},{′i}
lnZ1({pi(X) + i}i∈[n])− lnZ2({pi(X) + ′i}i∈[n]) +
∑
i
λi(i − ′i),
s.t., |i|, |′i| ≤ C.
Hence we have the claimed lower-bound,
min
{|i<C|}
lnE[RMLN ({pi(X) + i}i∈[n])] ≥ min{|i|<C} Z˜1({i}i∈[n])− max{|′i|<C}
Z˜2({′i}i∈[n]).
B.3 Supplementary results for Algorithm 1
Proposition (Monotonicity). When λi ≥ 0, Z˜r({i}i∈[n]) monotonically increases w.r.t. i; When λi ≤ −1,
Z˜r({i}i∈[n]) monotonically decreases w.r.t. i.
Proof. Recall that by definition we have
Zr({pi(X) + i}i∈[n]) =
∑
σ∈Ir
exp
{∑
Gi∈G
wGi(pi(X) + i)σ(xi) +
∑
H∈H
wHfH(σ(v¯H))
}
where wGi(pi(x)) = log[pi(X)/(1 − pi(X))] and I1 = Σ ∧ {σ(v) = 1} and I2 = Σ. We can rewrite the
perturbation on pi(X) as a perturbation on wGi :
wGi(pi(X) + i) = wGi + ˜i,
where
˜i = log
[
(1− pi(X))(pi(X) + i)
pi(X)(1− pi(X)− i)
]
.
Note that ˜i is monatomic in i. We also have
lnE[RMLN ({pi(X) + i}i∈[n])] = lnE[RMLN ({wGi(X) + ˜i}i∈[n])]
We can hence apply the same Lagrange multiplier procedure as in the above proof of Lemma 6 and conclude
that
Z˜r({i}i∈[n]) := lnZr({pi(X) + i}i∈[n]) +
∑
i
λii
= lnZr({wGi(X) + ˜i}i∈[n]) +
∑
i
λi˜i,
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where i ∈ [−C,C] ˜i ∈ [−C ′, C ′] with C ′ = log
[
(1−pi(X))(pi(X)+C)
pi(X)(1−pi(X)−C)
]
. We are now in the position to rewrite
Z˜r as a function of ˜i and obtain
Z˜r({′i}i∈[n]) = ln
∑
σ∈Ir
exp
{∑
Gi∈G
(wGi + ˜i)σ(xi) +
∑
H∈H
wHfH(σ(v¯H))
}
+
∑
i
λi˜i
= ln
∑
σ∈Ir
exp
{∑
Gi∈G
wGiσ(xi) +
∑
i
(σ(xi) + λi)˜i +
∑
H∈H
wHfH(σ(v¯H))
}
Since σ(xi) ∈ {0, 1}, when λi ≥ 0, σ(xi) + λi ≥ 0 and Z˜r monotonically increases in ˜i and hence in i. When
λi ≤ −1, σ(xi) + λi ≤ 0 and Z˜r monotonically decreases in ˜i and hence in i.
Proposition (Convexity). Z˜r({˜i}i∈[n]) is a convex function in ˜i,∀i with
˜i = log
[
(1− pi(X))(pi(X) + i)
pi(X)(1− pi(X)− i)
]
.
Proof. We take the second derivative of Z˜r with respect to ˜i,
∂2Z˜r
∂21
=
∑
σ∈Ir (σ(xi) + λi)
2 exp
{∑
Gj∈G wGjσ(xj) +
∑
j(σ(xj) + λj)˜j +
∑
H∈H wHfH(σ(v¯H))
}
∑
σ∈Ir exp
{∑
Gj∈G wGjσ(xj) +
∑
j(σ(xj) + λj)˜j +
∑
H∈H wHfH(σ(v¯H))
}
−
∑σ∈Ir (σ(xi) + λi) exp
{∑
Gj∈G wGjσ(xj) +
∑
j(σ(xj) + λj)˜j +
∑
H∈H wHfH(σ(v¯H))
}
∑
σ∈Ir exp
{∑
Gj∈G wGjσ(xj) +
∑
j(σ(xj) + λj)˜j +
∑
H∈H wHfH(σ(v¯H))
}
2 .
The above is simply the variance of σ(xi) + λi, namely E
[
(σ(xi) + λi)
2
]− E [σ(xi) + λi]2 ≥ 0. The convexity
of Z˜r in ˜i follows.
C Bayesian Networks
A Bayesian network is a probabilistic graphical model which represents a set of variables and their conditional
dependencies with a directed acyclic graph. Let us first consider a Bayesian Network with tree structure, the
probability of a random variable being 1 is given by
Pr [X = 1, {pi}] =
∑
x1,...xn
P (1|x1, ..., xn)
∏
i
pxii (1− pi)1−xi .
We now introduce the set of perturbation {i} on {pi} and consider the maximum resultant probability:
max
1...n
∑
x1,...xn
P (1|x1, ..., xn)
∏
i
(pi + i)
xi(1− pi − i)1−xi
= max
1...n
∑
x1,...xn−1
(∏
i<n
(pi + i)
xi(1− pi − i)1−xi
)
×
(
P (1|x1, ..., xn−1, 0)(1− pn − n) + P (1|x1, ..., xn−1, 1)(pn + n)
)
= max
1...n
∑
x1,...xn−1
(∏
i<n
(pi + i)
xi(1− pi − i)1−xi
)
×
(
P (1|x1, ..., xn−1, 0) + (P (1|x1, ..., xn−1, 1)− P (1|x1, ..., xn−1, 0)) (pn + n)
)
.
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In the above we have isolated the last variable in the expression. Without additional structure, the above
optimisation over perturbation is hard. We state the general hardness result in the following theorem.
Theorem (BN hardness). Given a Bayesian network with a set of parameters {pi}, a set of perturbation
parameters {i} and threshold δ, deciding whether
|Pr [X = 1; {pi}]−Pr [X = 1; {pi + i}] | < δ
is at least as hard as estimating Pr [X = 1; {pi}] up to εc multiplicative error, with i = O(εc).
Proof. Let α = [pi], Q(σ) = X and piα defined by the the probability distribution of a target random variable.
Since X ∈ {0, 1}, we have Eσ∼piα [Q(σ)] = Pr [X = 1; {pi}]. The proof then follows analogously from
Theorem 4 (COUNTING ≤t ROBUSTNESS).
If additionally we require the Bayesian network to be binary trees, we show that the optimisation over
perturbation and the checking of robustness of the model is trackable. We summarise the procedure for
checking robustness of binary tree structured BNs in the following theorem.
Theorem (Binary BN Robustness). Given a Bayesian network with binary tree structure, and the set of
parameters {pi}, the probability of a variable X = 1,
Pr [X = 1, {pi}] =
∑
x1,x2
P (1|x1, x2)
∏
i
pxii (1− pi)1−xi
is δb-robust, where
δb = max
{∣∣∣Pr [X = 1, {pi}]− Fmax∣∣∣, ∣∣∣Pr [X = 1, {pi}]− Fmin∣∣∣},
with Fmax = max
y1,y2
A0 +A1(y1 + y2) + (A2 −A1)y1y2,
Fmin = min
y1,y2
A0 +A1(y1 + y2) + (A2 −A1)y1y2,
s.t., yi ∈ [pi − C, pi + C],
Where A0 = P (1|0, 0), A1 = P (1|0, 1) − P (1|0, 0) and A2 = P (1|1, 1) − P (1|0, 1) are all pre-computable
constants given the parameters of the Bayesian network.
20
Proof. We explicitly write out the probability subject to perturbation,
Pr [X = 1, {pi + i}] =
∑
x1,x2
P (1|x1, x2)
∏
i
(pi + i)
xi(1− pi − i)1−xi
=(p1 + 1)
∑
x2
P (1|1, x2)(p2 + 2)x2(1− p2 − 2)1−x2
+ (1− p1 − 1)
∑
x2
P (1|0, x2)(p2 + 2)x2(1− p2 − 2)1−x2
=
∑
x2
P (1|0, x2)(p2 + 2)x2(1− p2 − 2)1−x2
+ (p1 + 1)
(∑
x2
(
P (1|1, x2)− P (1|0, x2)
)
(p2 + 2)
x2(1− p2 − 2)1−x2
)
=
∑
x2
P (1|0, x2)(p2 + 2)x2(1− p2 − 2)1−x2
+ (p1 + 1)
((
P (1|1, 1)− P (1|0, 1)
)
(p2 + 2) +
(
P (1|1, 0)− P (1|0, 0)
)
(1− p2 − 2)
)
=P (1|0, 0) +
(
P (1|0, 1)− P (1|0, 0)
)
(p2 + 2) + (p1 + 1)×(
P (1|1, 0)− P (1|0, 0) +
(
P (1|1, 1)− P (1|0, 1)− P (1|1, 0) + P (1|0, 0)
)
(p2 + 2)
)
.
It follows that the robustness problem boils down to finding the maximum and minimum of F = A0 +A1y2 +
A1y1 + (A2 −A1)y1y2, with yi = pi + i.
Specifically, in order to compute Fmax and Fmin, we take partial derivatives of F:
∂F
∂y1
= A1 + (A2 −A1)y2,
∂F
∂y2
= A1 + (A2 −A1)y1.
Setting ∂F∂y1 =
∂F
∂y2
= 0 leads to y∗1 = y
∗
2 =
A1
A1−A2 . In order to check if y
∗
i correspond to maximum or minimum.
evaluate ∂
2F
∂y2i
= A2 −A1. We have the following scenarios:
• If y∗i ∈ [pi − C, pi + C] and A2 −A1 > 0, then y∗i correspond to a minimum.
• If y∗i ∈ [pi − C, pi + C] and A2 −A1 < 0, then y∗i correspond to a maximum.
• If y∗i /∈ [pi − C, pi + C], then yi is monotonic in the range of [pi − C, pi + C] and the maximum or
minimum are found at pi ± C.
Having shown the robustness of probability of one node in the Bayesian network, the robustness of the whole
network can be computed recursively from the bottom to the top.
D 1-Nearest Neighbour
Consider the following setting. Let Xt be a test example, and X = {ti = (X(a)i , X(b)i , vi, yi)}i∈[N ] is a training
set where vi = B(ai) is a Bernoulli random variable. When vi = 0, the ithtraining example ti is X(a)i and
when vi = 1 the ith training example is X
(b)
i . We focus on binary classification task yi ∈ {0, 1}. One possible
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world is a function σ : [N ] 7→ 0, 1 that maps each vi to 0 or 1. Let I be all possible worlds. Given a possible
world σ, the similarity between Xt and ti is
sim(Xt, ti;σ) = Kernel
(
(1− σ(vi))X(a)t + σ(vi)X(b)t , Xt
)
Let NN(Xt;X , σ) is the top-1 training example defined under the above possible world and yNN(Xt;X ,σ) is its
label. The marginal probability of Xt taking label 1 is:
s(a¯ = (a1, ..., aN )) =
∑
σ∈I
(∏
i
a
1−σ(vi)
i (1− ai)σ(vi)
)
yNN(Xt;X ,σ) (1)
Figure 5: Illustration of the training points in a 1-NN model, with the horizontal direction representing the
value of similarity.
We now illustrate an efficient procedure to compute (1). Define bi = 1− ai, and the convention that
• Kernel(X(b)i , Xt) > Kernel(X(a)i , Xt) and Kernel(X(b)1 , Xt) < ... < Kernel(X(b)N , Xt)
• No ties in all kernel values.
With theses convention, all training data points can be aligned as in Figure 5. Without loss of generality, we
take the jth example (the a4 in the Figure 5) as
j = arg max
i∈[N ]
Kernel(X
(a)
i , Xt).
Furthermore, let hth example be the example with largest ID (b2 in the figure) such that Kernel(X
(b)
i , Xt) <
Kernel(X
(a)
j , Xt):
h = arg max
i∈[N ]
Kernel(X
(b)
i , Xt)
s.t., Kernel(X
(b)
i , Xt) < Kernel(X
(a)
j , Xt)
From the above Figure, we see that, all examples before (include) example h cannot have a chance to be top-1
since it will always be dominated by example j in all possible worlds. Furthermore, All examples i except
example j cannot be top-1 when their σ(vi) = 0 since they will always be dominated by example j. As such
all top-1 example can only be chosen from the following scenarios:
22
• Example j when σ(vj) = 0. The probability is given by
aj
∏
i>h;i 6=j
ai =
∏
i>h
ai.
• Example k > h when σ(vk) = 1. The probability is given by
(1− ak)
∏
i>k
ai.
Hence we have shown (1) can be rewritten as
s(a¯) =
(∏
i>h
ai
)
yj +
∑
k>h
(
(1− ak)
∏
i>k
ai
)
yk.
D.1 Provable Robustness
The above notion reasons about the maximal distribution distortion when each ai is change to (1 + i)ai.
Hence we are concerned about comparing
s(a¯) =
(∏
i>h
ai
)
yj +
∑
k>h
(
(1− ak)
∏
i>k
ai
)
yk
with
s((1 + ) ◦ a¯) =
(∏
i>h
(1 + i)ai
)
yj +
∑
k>h
(
(1− (1 + k)ak)
∏
i>k
(1 + i)ai
)
yk. (2)
The 1-NN classifier is (C,∞, δ)-robust on test example Xt if
∀|¯|∞ < C |s(a¯)− s((1 + ) ◦ a¯)| < δ,
where ◦ is the Hadamard product (element-wise multiplication).
Theorem (1-NN Robustness). Given training set X = {ti = (X(a)i , X(b)i , vi = B(ai), yi)}i∈[N ] and output
labels yNN (Xt), the marginal probability s(a¯ = (a1, ..., aN )) of a test example Xt taking label 1 in a 1-NN
model parametrised by {ai}i∈[N ] is (C,∞, δ1NN )-robust where
δ1NN = max
{
|s(a¯)−max

s((1 + ) ◦ a¯)|, |s(a¯)−min

s((1 + ) ◦ a¯)|
}
,
can be computed efficiently by assigning ∗i = arg maxi(1 + i)ai, or 
∗∗
i = arg mini(1 + i)ai.
Proof. We proceed by isolating the N th term in (2):
s((1 + ) ◦ a¯)
= (1 + N )aN
( ∏
N>i>h
(1 + i)ai
)
yj + (1− (1 + N )aN )yN
+ (1 + N )aN
∑
N>k>h
(
(1− (1 + k)ak)
∏
N>i>k
(1 + i)ai
)
yk
= (1 + N )aN
(
yj
∏
N>i>h
(1 + i)ai +
∑
N>k>h
(
(1− (1 + k)ak)
∏
N>i>k
(1 + i)ai
)
yk
)
+ yN − (1 + N )aNyN
= yN + (1 + N )aN
(
−yN + yj
∏
N>i>h
(1 + i)ai +
∑
N>k>h
(
(1− (1 + k)ak)
∏
N>i>k
(1 + i)ai
)
yk
)
.
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We now consider two cases separately, when yN = 0, we have
s((1 + ) ◦ a¯) = (1 + N )aN
(
yj
∏
N>i>h
(1 + i)ai +
∑
N>k>h
(
(1− (1 + k)ak)
∏
N>i>k
(1 + i)ai
)
yk
)
.
Since N only appear once, the maximisation can be factorised as
max
1...N
s((1 + ) ◦ a¯)
=
(
max
N
(1 + N )aN
)
max
1,...N−1
(
yj
∏
N>i>h
(1 + i)ai +
∑
N>k>h
(
(1− (1 + k)ak)
∏
N>i>k
(1 + i)ai
)
yk
)
.
On the other hand, when yN = 1, we have instead
s((1 + ) ◦ a¯)
= 1− (1 + N )aN
(
1− yj
∏
N>i>h
(1 + i)ai −
∑
N>k>h
(
(1− (1 + k)ak)
∏
N>i>k
(1 + i)ai
)
yk
)
.
Inside the parentheses is one minus a probability which is none negative, as a result we can recast the
maximisation as
max
1...N
s((1 + ) ◦ a¯)
= min
1...N
(1 + N )aN
(
1− yj
∏
N>i>h
(1 + i)ai −
∑
N>k>h
(
(1− (1 + k)ak)
∏
N>i>k
(1 + i)ai
)
yk
)
=
(
min
N
(1 + N )aN
)
min
1,...N−1
(
1− yj
∏
N>i>h
(1 + i)ai −
∑
N>k>h
(
(1− (1 + k)ak)
∏
N>i>k
(1 + i)ai
)
yk
)
.
We have seen that given a known value of yN , s((1 + ) ◦ a¯) can be written as a monotonic function in N .
Thus the maximal assignment given the range of N that maximises the perturbed marginal probability can be
easily found. The above procedure can then be applied recursively from N − 1 to h to solve
max
1,...N−1
(
yj
∏
N>i>h
(1 + i)ai +
∑
N>k>h
(
(1− (1 + k)ak)
∏
N>i>k
(1 + i)ai
)
yk
)
,
or
min
1,...N−1
(
yj
∏
N>i>h
(1 + i)ai +
∑
N>k>h
(
(1− (1 + k)ak)
∏
N>i>k
(1 + i)ai
)
yk
)
.
Computing the minimum of s((1 + ) ◦ a¯) takes an analogous procedure by replacing max with min from the
beginning.
E Relationship Extraction on ImageNet
Besides the OCR and NLP datasets, we also evaluate the robustness of our proposed end-to-end Sensing-
Reasoning pipeline on large scale dataset such as ImageNet ILSVRC2012 [DDS+09]. First, we select 7 animal
categories, containing {chimpanzee, gibbon, gorilla, guenon, macaque, orangutan, siamang}, based on which
we construct internal class nodes to construct the basic hierarchy structure according to the WordNet, and we
then build a HEX graph based on the concepts from [DDJ+14]. This knowledge in this dataset includes the
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hierarchy structures between different categories of animals. For instance, the category “ape” would include
the instances belong to “great ape, lesser ape, ape, monkey”. Here we aim to evaluate the certified robustness
bound of the sensing-reasoning pipeline on such large scale dataset with structure knowledge.
Within the HEX graph, we develop edges with two different types:
• Hierarchy edge (u, v): class u subsumes class v. That means ¬xv ∨ xu = True
• Exclusion edge (u, v): class u and class v are naturally exclusive. That means xu ∧ xv = False
After constructing the HEX graph, we then build the MLN model with 11 sensing models for each node,
following the rules of the Hierarchy edges and Exclusion edges. For each leaf node, we select 1300 images
from ILSVRC2012 training set and 50 images from ILSVRC2012 dev set. We split the 1300 training images
into 1000 for training and 300 as testing data for each leaf node. For each internal node, we uniformly sample
the training data from its child nodes’ training set to construct the training and testing set with the same size,
since there is no specific instances for the categories of internal nodes in ImageNet.
We evaluate the robustness of our Sensing-Reasoning pipeline by comparing to the baseline model (without
knowledge) under both benign and adversarial scenario with the same criteria in the main paper (end-to-end
accuracy, certified robustness bound, and the tightness of our certified robustness bound). The corresponding
results are shown in Table E 2 and Figure 6.
Figure 6: (ImageNet) Histogram of the difference between the probability of the correct class (lower bound)
and the top wrong class (upper bound) under perturbation. If such a difference is positive, it means
that the classifier makes the right prediction under perturbation. (a) - (d) show perturbations with scale
C = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5.
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Figure 7: (ImageNet) Histogram of the difference between the probability of the correct class (lower
bound) and the top wrong class (upper bound) under perturbation. If such a difference is positive, it means
that the classifier makes the right prediction under perturbation. Evaluate under attacking 10% sensing
models,  = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5 from (a) to (d).
Figure 8: (ImageNet) Histogram of the difference between the probability of the correct class (lower
bound) and the top wrong class (upper bound) under perturbation. If such a difference is positive, it means
that the classifier makes the right prediction under perturbation. Evaluate under attacking 30% sensing
models,  = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5 from (a) to (d).
Figure 9: (ImageNet) Histogram of the difference between the probability of the correct class (lower
bound) and the top wrong class (upper bound) under perturbation. If such a difference is positive, it means
that the classifier makes the right prediction under perturbation. Evaluate under attacking all sensing
models,  = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5 from (a) to (d).
26
Table 2: End-to-end accuracy and certification between different approaches with different perturbations on
ImageNet.
(a) (ImageNet) Attack 10% sensing models
With knowledge Without knowledge
 E2E accuracy Cert. Ratio E2E accuracy Cert. Ratio
0.1 0.9100 0.9800 0.9000 0.9000
0.2 0.9000 0.9700 0.7500 0.7500
0.2 0.9000 0.9700 0.5600 0.5600
0.5 0.8200 0.8900 0.0000 0.0000
0.9 0.6400 0.7000 0.0000 0.0000
(b) (ImageNet) Attack 30% sensing models
With knowledge Without knowledge
 E2E accuracy Cert. Ratio E2E accuracy Cert. Ratio
0.1 0.9000 0.9600 0.9000 0.9000
0.2 0.8200 0.8800 0.7500 0.7500
0.3 0.7900 0.8500 0.5600 0.5600
0.5 0.6900 0.7500 0.0000 0.0000
0.9 0.3800 0.4200 0.0000 0.0000
(c) (ImageNet) Attack all sensing models
With knowledge Without knowledge
 E2E accuracy Cert. Ratio E2E accuracy Cert. Ratio
0.1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
0.2 0.9100 0.9100 0.9300 0.9300
0.3 0.6200 0.6200 0.8000 0.8000
0.5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.9 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
F OCR Theoretical bound evaluation
We choose the attacked ratio α = 0.1, 0.3, 1.0 while the perturbation scale C = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.9 to test the
tightness of theoretical bound. For α = 0.1, 0.3 we choose the recognized arithmetic expression with length
no longer than 12 and for α = 1.0 we test the tightness of our theoretical bound based on the augmented
data from the raw equation images with length no longer than 5 by adding perturbation on the pixel level.
During the attack phrase, We add the perturbation  ∈ [0, C] under the uniform distribution on each
attacked bounding boxes that:
p′ = clip(p− , 10−5, 1− 10−5)
We simulate the attack process multiple times on each cases so we can have a list of character level output
confidence value as E. We define the empirical lower probability el as the minimum value in E and the same
as empirical upper probability eu. And for each case we can also have its corresponding theoretical bound tl
(lower) and tu (upper) obtained by solving the optimization problem. Thus we have the el, eu, tl, tu and we
expect that:
tl ≤ el ≤ eu ≤ tu
We define the tightness of bound into two parts rl and ru while:
rl =
el − tl
el
, ru =
tu − eu
eu
We can show the rl, ru w.r.t the el, eu, tl, tu to see the relationship between different α,  setting. The λ
sampling we chose two disjoint grid search interval: [−2.001,−1.001] with step = 0.25 and [0.001, 1.001] with
step = 0.25.
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el eu tl tu rl ru
0.9975 0.9985 0.9970 0.9990 0.0005 0.0005
0.9780 0.9865 0.9775 0.9870 0.0005 0.0005
0.5372 0.6624 0.5369 0.6665 0.0006 0.0062
0.9906 0.9965 0.9895 0.9975 0.0011 0.0010
0.8162 0.8717 0.8158 0.8721 0.0005 0.0005
0.9968 0.9985 0.9960 0.9992 0.0008 0.0007
0.9807 0.9850 0.7843 1.0000 0.2003 0.0152
0.9964 0.9975 0.7734 1.0000 0.2238 0.0025
0.0234 0.0381 0.0232 0.0383 0.0085 0.0052
0.9957 0.9974 0.9952 0.9979 0.0005 0.0005
0.9240 0.9510 0.9231 0.9515 0.0010 0.0005
0.9991 0.9993 0.7168 1.0000 0.2826 0.0007
0.9994 0.9997 0.9985 1.0000 0.0009 0.0003
0.5858 0.7036 0.5848 0.7040 0.0017 0.0006
1.0000 1.0000 0.9995 1.0000 0.0005 0.0000
0.7299 0.8207 0.7286 0.8218 0.0018 0.0013
0.6217 0.7617 0.6210 0.7634 0.0011 0.0022
0.8681 0.9134 0.8674 0.9138 0.0008 0.0004
0.7452 0.8140 0.7448 0.8156 0.0005 0.0020
0.9842 0.9959 0.9828 0.9973 0.0014 0.0014
0.8071 0.8693 0.8048 0.8700 0.0028 0.0008
1.0000 1.0000 0.9995 1.0000 0.0005 0.0000
0.9975 0.9986 0.9969 0.9992 0.0006 0.0006
0.6655 0.7953 0.6645 0.7960 0.0015 0.0009
0.0154 0.0260 0.0153 0.0261 0.0065 0.0038
0.7753 0.8606 0.7743 0.8628 0.0013 0.0026
1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 1.0000 0.0010 0.0000
0.7820 0.8486 0.7816 0.8492 0.0005 0.0007
1.0000 1.0000 0.9991 1.0000 0.0009 0.0000
0.6168 0.7101 0.6163 0.7144 0.0008 0.0061
0.0070 0.0110 0.0070 0.0110 0.0000 0.0000
0.9785 0.9871 0.9780 0.9878 0.0005 0.0007
0.9940 0.9976 0.9931 0.9986 0.0009 0.0010
0.9999 0.9999 0.9993 1.0000 0.0006 0.0001
0.9803 0.9941 0.9791 0.9953 0.0012 0.0012
0.9409 0.9605 0.9404 0.9611 0.0005 0.0006
0.4458 0.5756 0.4451 0.5762 0.0016 0.0010
0.9971 0.9987 0.9963 0.9995 0.0008 0.0008
0.9995 0.9997 0.9991 1.0000 0.0004 0.0003
1.0000 1.0000 0.9991 1.0000 0.0009 0.0000
0.8949 0.9487 0.8939 0.9502 0.0011 0.0016
0.6777 0.7906 0.6745 0.7911 0.0047 0.0006
0.9943 0.9972 0.9936 0.9979 0.0007 0.0007
Table 3: Theoretical bound, α = 0.1,  = 0.1
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el eu tl tu rl ru
1.0000 1.0000 0.9986 1.0000 0.0014 0.0000
0.9834 0.9927 0.9825 0.9936 0.0009 0.0009
0.8503 0.9542 0.8449 0.9558 0.0064 0.0017
0.9932 0.9972 0.9923 0.9982 0.0009 0.0010
0.6671 0.8244 0.6664 0.8262 0.0010 0.0022
0.9387 0.9790 0.9376 0.9803 0.0012 0.0013
0.9949 0.9996 0.9919 1.0000 0.0030 0.0004
0.0454 0.0989 0.0452 0.0996 0.0044 0.0071
0.9981 0.9992 0.9972 1.0000 0.0009 0.0008
0.6405 0.8809 0.6362 0.8890 0.0067 0.0092
1.0000 1.0000 0.9981 1.0000 0.0019 0.0000
0.9999 0.9999 0.6143 1.0000 0.3856 0.0001
1.0000 1.0000 0.9979 1.0000 0.0021 0.0000
0.9531 0.9806 0.9522 0.9816 0.0009 0.0010
0.0667 0.1723 0.0666 0.1786 0.0015 0.0366
0.0044 0.0100 0.0044 0.0101 0.0000 0.0100
0.8431 0.9303 0.8418 0.9313 0.0015 0.0011
1.0000 1.0000 0.9992 1.0000 0.0008 0.0000
0.9696 0.9956 0.9676 0.9980 0.0021 0.0024
0.7356 0.8664 0.7307 0.8704 0.0067 0.0046
1.0000 1.0000 0.9991 1.0000 0.0009 0.0000
0.9984 0.9993 0.9975 1.0000 0.0009 0.0007
0.9996 0.9999 0.9983 1.0000 0.0013 0.0001
0.7844 0.9503 0.7817 0.9579 0.0034 0.0080
0.6458 0.8603 0.6437 0.8634 0.0033 0.0036
0.5024 0.7640 0.5010 0.7649 0.0028 0.0012
0.9908 0.9976 0.9894 0.9991 0.0014 0.0015
0.7689 0.8875 0.7673 0.8893 0.0021 0.0020
0.5197 0.7126 0.5171 0.7147 0.0050 0.0029
0.1842 0.5557 0.1810 0.5591 0.0174 0.0061
0.8897 0.9456 0.8849 0.9465 0.0054 0.0010
0.8620 0.9666 0.8592 0.9686 0.0032 0.0021
1.0000 1.0000 0.9982 1.0000 0.0018 0.0000
0.6863 0.8751 0.6851 0.8791 0.0017 0.0046
0.8996 0.9542 0.8984 0.9552 0.0013 0.0010
0.3421 0.5686 0.3413 0.5764 0.0023 0.0137
1.0000 1.0000 0.9992 1.0000 0.0008 0.0000
0.9984 0.9997 0.9969 1.0000 0.0015 0.0003
0.9625 0.9862 0.9606 0.9872 0.0020 0.0010
1.0000 1.0000 0.9986 1.0000 0.0014 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9983 1.0000 0.0017 0.0000
0.9906 0.9971 0.9893 0.9985 0.0013 0.0014
0.9943 0.9972 0.9936 0.9979 0.0007 0.0007
Table 4: Theoretical bound, α = 0.1,  = 0.2
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el eu tl tu rl ru
0.9994 0.9999 0.9979 1.0000 0.0015 0.0001
0.9755 0.9927 0.9740 0.9940 0.0015 0.0013
0.5776 0.8785 0.5766 0.8803 0.0017 0.0020
0.9739 0.9964 0.9710 0.9985 0.0030 0.0021
0.6883 0.8864 0.6861 0.8880 0.0032 0.0018
0.9811 0.9963 0.9793 0.9981 0.0018 0.0018
0.9737 0.9847 0.4871 1.0000 0.4997 0.0155
0.9187 0.9744 0.9167 0.9761 0.0022 0.0017
0.0067 0.0348 0.0067 0.0366 0.0000 0.0517
0.2823 0.5821 0.2806 0.5831 0.0060 0.0017
0.9899 0.9975 0.9882 0.9990 0.0017 0.0015
0.6168 0.8530 0.6155 0.8566 0.0021 0.0042
0.9943 0.9987 0.9928 1.0000 0.0015 0.0013
0.7450 0.9189 0.7383 0.9214 0.0090 0.0027
0.0714 0.2111 0.0712 0.2154 0.0028 0.0204
0.4978 0.7807 0.4952 0.7828 0.0052 0.0027
0.5374 0.8186 0.5351 0.8225 0.0043 0.0048
0.0275 0.1521 0.0268 0.1567 0.0255 0.0302
0.9874 0.9971 0.9858 0.9988 0.0016 0.0017
0.5695 0.8128 0.5599 0.8162 0.0169 0.0042
0.9986 0.9998 0.9965 1.0000 0.0021 0.0002
0.9858 0.9991 0.9823 1.0000 0.0036 0.0009
1.0000 1.0000 0.9982 1.0000 0.0018 0.0000
0.9942 0.9983 0.9929 0.9996 0.0013 0.0013
0.9442 0.9883 0.9427 0.9902 0.0016 0.0019
0.1449 0.3705 0.1445 0.3710 0.0028 0.0013
0.5423 0.8591 0.5400 0.8638 0.0042 0.0055
0.4009 0.7640 0.3965 0.7652 0.0110 0.0016
1.0000 1.0000 0.9980 1.0000 0.0020 0.0000
0.3938 0.8868 0.3875 0.9001 0.0160 0.0150
0.4181 0.7115 0.4163 0.7150 0.0043 0.0049
0.0031 0.0110 0.0031 0.0110 0.0000 0.0000
0.8354 0.9453 0.8315 0.9469 0.0047 0.0017
0.9834 0.9975 0.9813 0.9997 0.0021 0.0022
0.9962 0.9995 0.9940 1.0000 0.0022 0.0005
0.9750 0.9927 0.9737 0.9941 0.0013 0.0014
0.7753 0.9614 0.7691 0.9639 0.0080 0.0026
0.9207 0.9772 0.9192 0.9786 0.0016 0.0014
1.0000 1.0000 0.9988 1.0000 0.0012 0.0000
0.9966 0.9997 0.9943 1.0000 0.0023 0.0003
0.9990 0.9997 0.9977 1.0000 0.0013 0.0003
0.1873 0.6463 0.1864 0.6556 0.0048 0.0144
0.9753 0.9958 0.9734 0.9976 0.0019 0.0018
0.9859 0.9972 0.9838 0.9989 0.0021 0.0017
Table 5: Theoretical bound, α = 0.1,  = 0.3
30
el eu tl tu rl ru
0.9993 0.9999 0.9970 1.0000 0.0023 0.0001
1.0000 1.0000 0.9967 1.0000 0.0033 0.0000
0.6144 0.9454 0.6095 0.9570 0.0080 0.0123
0.9788 0.9978 0.9763 1.0000 0.0026 0.0022
0.9886 0.9991 0.9857 1.0000 0.0029 0.0009
0.9820 0.9984 0.9791 1.0000 0.0030 0.0016
0.8623 0.9818 0.8574 0.9843 0.0057 0.0025
0.8740 0.9856 0.8674 0.9880 0.0076 0.0024
0.0035 0.0334 0.0034 0.0338 0.0286 0.0120
0.9998 1.0000 0.9966 1.0000 0.0032 0.0000
0.9769 0.9974 0.9747 0.9996 0.0023 0.0022
0.3336 0.8869 0.3299 0.8901 0.0111 0.0036
0.9753 0.9977 0.9722 1.0000 0.0032 0.0023
0.5063 0.8991 0.4897 0.9029 0.0328 0.0042
0.2078 0.7024 0.2050 0.7052 0.0135 0.0040
0.9894 0.9989 0.9870 1.0000 0.0024 0.0011
1.0000 1.0000 0.9964 1.0000 0.0036 0.0000
0.0008 0.0073 0.0008 0.0073 0.0000 0.0000
0.5280 0.9114 0.5257 0.9155 0.0044 0.0045
0.2057 0.8063 0.2015 0.8176 0.0204 0.0140
1.0000 1.0000 0.9973 1.0000 0.0027 0.0000
0.4292 0.8747 0.4256 0.8780 0.0084 0.0038
1.0000 1.0000 0.9969 1.0000 0.0031 0.0000
0.9846 0.9983 0.9820 1.0000 0.0026 0.0017
0.2611 0.7825 0.2593 0.7974 0.0069 0.0190
0.0680 0.3739 0.0622 0.3822 0.0853 0.0222
1.0000 1.0000 0.9969 1.0000 0.0031 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9973 1.0000 0.0027 0.0000
0.9493 0.9963 0.9462 1.0000 0.0033 0.0037
0.0646 0.4210 0.0641 0.4271 0.0077 0.0145
0.9510 0.9957 0.9484 0.9983 0.0027 0.0026
0.0504 0.3440 0.0495 0.3481 0.0179 0.0119
1.0000 1.0000 0.9974 1.0000 0.0026 0.0000
0.9538 0.9945 0.9511 0.9970 0.0028 0.0025
0.9992 0.9999 0.9969 1.0000 0.0023 0.0001
0.9387 0.9927 0.9365 0.9950 0.0023 0.0023
0.7190 0.9606 0.7152 0.9629 0.0053 0.0024
0.1336 0.5750 0.1306 0.5767 0.0225 0.0030
0.9794 0.9986 0.9765 1.0000 0.0030 0.0014
0.9944 0.9996 0.9916 1.0000 0.0028 0.0004
1.0000 1.0000 0.9973 1.0000 0.0027 0.0000
0.8945 0.9952 0.8907 0.9987 0.0042 0.0035
0.2920 0.7840 0.2899 0.7924 0.0072 0.0107
0.9115 0.9917 0.9080 0.9953 0.0038 0.0036
Table 6: Theoretical bound, α = 0.1,  = 0.5
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el eu tl tu rl ru
0.0167 0.9919 0.0165 1.0000 0.0120 0.0082
0.0559 0.9928 0.0555 1.0000 0.0072 0.0073
0.9998 1.0000 0.9937 1.0000 0.0061 0.0000
0.4012 0.9964 0.3977 1.0000 0.0087 0.0036
0.0146 0.7414 0.0134 0.8367 0.0822 0.1285
1.0000 1.0000 0.9912 1.0000 0.0088 0.0000
0.9634 0.9845 0.1781 1.0000 0.8151 0.0157
0.0046 0.9426 0.0046 0.9531 0.0000 0.0111
0.0000 0.0319 0.0000 0.0340 0.0000 0.0658
0.9972 1.0000 0.9905 1.0000 0.0067 0.0000
0.0634 0.9965 0.0629 1.0000 0.0079 0.0035
0.0102 0.9613 0.0101 0.9698 0.0098 0.0088
0.1278 0.9987 0.1267 1.0000 0.0086 0.0013
0.4070 0.9943 0.3555 1.0000 0.1265 0.0057
1.0000 1.0000 0.9941 1.0000 0.0059 0.0000
0.0063 0.9604 0.0062 0.9687 0.0159 0.0086
0.9284 0.9998 0.9211 1.0000 0.0079 0.0002
0.0232 0.9845 0.0230 0.9923 0.0086 0.0079
0.0036 0.9130 0.0036 0.9207 0.0000 0.0084
0.0026 0.8055 0.0026 0.8213 0.0000 0.0196
0.0028 0.8793 0.0008 0.8896 0.7143 0.0117
0.3301 0.9912 0.3196 1.0000 0.0318 0.0089
1.0000 1.0000 0.9920 1.0000 0.0080 0.0000
0.1499 0.9981 0.1487 1.0000 0.0080 0.0019
0.0006 0.7789 0.0006 0.8024 0.0000 0.0302
0.0003 0.3575 0.0003 0.3734 0.0000 0.0445
0.0020 0.8482 0.0020 0.8705 0.0000 0.0263
1.0000 1.0000 0.9936 1.0000 0.0064 0.0000
0.0023 0.8399 0.0023 0.8555 0.0000 0.0186
0.0022 0.8108 0.0022 0.8259 0.0000 0.0186
0.0008 0.8112 0.0008 0.8324 0.0000 0.0261
0.0006 0.7702 0.0006 0.7956 0.0000 0.0330
0.0215 0.9869 0.0213 0.9953 0.0093 0.0085
0.6682 0.9976 0.4664 1.0000 0.3020 0.0024
0.0016 0.8060 0.0015 0.8127 0.0625 0.0083
1.0000 1.0000 0.9924 1.0000 0.0076 0.0000
0.0003 0.6024 0.0003 0.6288 0.0000 0.0438
0.1927 0.9923 0.0144 1.0000 0.9253 0.0078
0.6620 0.9987 0.5788 1.0000 0.1257 0.0013
0.3877 0.9997 0.3844 1.0000 0.0085 0.0003
1.0000 1.0000 0.9930 1.0000 0.0070 0.0000
0.3835 0.9953 0.3701 1.0000 0.0349 0.0047
0.1041 0.9958 0.0433 1.0000 0.5841 0.0042
0.1022 0.9920 0.0149 1.0000 0.8542 0.0081
Table 7: Theoretical bound, α = 0.1,  = 0.9
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el eu tl tu rl ru
0.9822 0.9892 0.9809 0.9905 0.0013 0.0013
0.9890 0.9928 0.9884 0.9932 0.0006 0.0004
0.9561 0.9777 0.7969 1.0000 0.1665 0.0228
0.9955 0.9973 0.9938 0.9990 0.0017 0.0017
0.4815 0.8178 0.4492 0.8807 0.0671 0.0769
0.6393 0.7484 0.6255 0.7682 0.0216 0.0265
0.8619 0.9437 0.8403 0.9691 0.0251 0.0269
0.9535 0.9549 0.9213 0.9737 0.0338 0.0197
0.9886 0.9971 0.9870 0.9989 0.0016 0.0018
0.9160 0.9621 0.9141 0.9643 0.0021 0.0023
0.9991 0.9993 0.7540 1.0000 0.2453 0.0007
1.0000 1.0000 0.8963 1.0000 0.1037 0.0000
0.2156 0.2348 0.1528 0.3193 0.2913 0.3599
0.9335 0.9606 0.9323 0.9619 0.0013 0.0014
0.9997 0.9998 0.9984 1.0000 0.0013 0.0002
0.0084 0.0141 0.0072 0.0163 0.1429 0.1560
0.9948 0.9972 0.9941 0.9979 0.0007 0.0007
1.0000 1.0000 0.9996 1.0000 0.0004 0.0000
0.7379 0.8652 0.6638 0.9624 0.1004 0.1123
0.9950 0.9991 0.7786 1.0000 0.2175 0.0009
1.0000 1.0000 0.9995 1.0000 0.0005 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9878 1.0000 0.0122 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9862 1.0000 0.0138 0.0000
0.4504 0.5243 0.3106 0.7193 0.3104 0.3719
0.7527 0.8621 0.7510 0.8629 0.0023 0.0009
1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 1.0000 0.0010 0.0000
0.8398 0.9350 0.6576 1.0000 0.2170 0.0695
0.0055 0.0064 0.0031 0.0112 0.4364 0.7500
0.5347 0.6911 0.4576 0.8079 0.1442 0.1690
0.8336 0.9315 0.6208 1.0000 0.2553 0.0735
0.0062 0.0137 0.0052 0.0175 0.1613 0.2774
0.9837 0.9946 0.8988 1.0000 0.0863 0.0054
0.3664 0.8028 0.3639 0.8082 0.0068 0.0067
0.9969 0.9980 0.9956 0.9993 0.0013 0.0013
0.5131 0.6323 0.4962 0.6531 0.0329 0.0329
1.0000 1.0000 0.7724 1.0000 0.2276 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9964 1.0000 0.0036 0.0000
0.9994 0.9997 0.9988 1.0000 0.0006 0.0003
0.9981 0.9992 0.9965 1.0000 0.0016 0.0008
0.8035 0.9385 0.4888 1.0000 0.3917 0.0655
0.6922 0.7902 0.6902 0.7911 0.0029 0.0011
0.9943 0.9972 0.9936 0.9979 0.0007 0.0007
Table 8: Theoretical bound, α = 0.3,  = 0.1
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el eu tl tu rl ru
0.9988 0.9997 0.9948 1.0000 0.0040 0.0003
0.9835 0.9928 0.9825 0.9936 0.0010 0.0008
0.8344 0.9534 0.3816 1.0000 0.5427 0.0489
0.9812 0.9989 0.9658 1.0000 0.0157 0.0011
0.5596 0.9104 0.4802 1.0000 0.1419 0.0984
0.8103 0.9524 0.8041 0.9619 0.0077 0.0100
0.9442 0.9813 0.6146 1.0000 0.3491 0.0191
0.9921 0.9992 0.8634 1.0000 0.1297 0.0008
0.8445 0.9291 0.8411 0.9312 0.0040 0.0023
1.0000 1.0000 0.6737 1.0000 0.3263 0.0000
0.9820 0.9974 0.9786 1.0000 0.0035 0.0026
0.8662 0.9614 0.7369 1.0000 0.1493 0.0401
1.0000 1.0000 0.9949 1.0000 0.0051 0.0000
0.9581 0.9952 0.5182 1.0000 0.4591 0.0048
0.9794 0.9949 0.8282 1.0000 0.1544 0.0051
0.9196 0.9598 0.6933 1.0000 0.2461 0.0419
0.9960 0.9998 0.9930 1.0000 0.0030 0.0002
0.0084 0.1517 0.0080 0.1678 0.0476 0.1061
0.8139 0.9101 0.8119 0.9142 0.0025 0.0045
1.0000 1.0000 0.9982 1.0000 0.0018 0.0000
0.5700 0.9062 0.4632 1.0000 0.1874 0.1035
0.9645 0.9990 0.7106 1.0000 0.2632 0.0010
1.0000 1.0000 0.9991 1.0000 0.0009 0.0000
0.9268 0.9895 0.9241 0.9920 0.0029 0.0025
0.7954 0.9684 0.5842 1.0000 0.2655 0.0326
0.0065 0.0259 0.0054 0.0320 0.1692 0.2355
1.0000 1.0000 0.9981 1.0000 0.0019 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9986 1.0000 0.0014 0.0000
0.8492 0.9341 0.8037 0.9858 0.0536 0.0553
0.1929 0.4237 0.1909 0.4293 0.0104 0.0132
0.7198 0.8326 0.5139 1.0000 0.2861 0.2011
0.1368 0.4293 0.0815 0.5365 0.4042 0.2497
0.7421 0.8729 0.5348 1.0000 0.2793 0.1456
0.8954 0.9977 0.8016 1.0000 0.1048 0.0023
0.5412 0.9048 0.3642 1.0000 0.3271 0.1052
0.9954 0.9980 0.9932 1.0000 0.0022 0.0020
0.4203 0.6334 0.3460 0.7676 0.1768 0.2119
0.3566 0.5747 0.2820 0.7263 0.2092 0.2638
0.9940 0.9987 0.9914 1.0000 0.0026 0.0013
0.9979 0.9996 0.9960 1.0000 0.0019 0.0004
0.9335 0.9856 0.9304 0.9894 0.0033 0.0039
1.0000 1.0000 0.7702 1.0000 0.2298 0.0000
0.9839 0.9955 0.9826 0.9972 0.0013 0.0017
0.9905 0.9972 0.9893 0.9985 0.0012 0.0013
Table 9: Theoretical bound, α = 0.3,  = 0.2
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el eu tl tu rl ru
1.0000 1.0000 0.9967 1.0000 0.0033 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9975 1.0000 0.0025 0.0000
0.8519 0.9769 0.5548 1.0000 0.3487 0.0236
0.9795 0.9972 0.9721 1.0000 0.0076 0.0028
0.9849 0.9992 0.4700 1.0000 0.5228 0.0008
0.7726 0.9906 0.4192 1.0000 0.4574 0.0095
0.9445 0.9806 0.2897 1.0000 0.6933 0.0198
0.8008 0.9854 0.6397 1.0000 0.2012 0.0148
0.0027 0.0332 0.0026 0.0341 0.0370 0.0271
0.9978 1.0000 0.9924 1.0000 0.0054 0.0000
0.9538 0.9964 0.9506 0.9999 0.0034 0.0035
0.9677 0.9945 0.5691 1.0000 0.4119 0.0055
0.9886 0.9977 0.9846 1.0000 0.0040 0.0023
0.7762 0.9175 0.5988 1.0000 0.2285 0.0899
0.0005 0.0006 0.0001 0.0022 0.8000 2.6667
0.4986 0.7789 0.4945 0.7838 0.0082 0.0063
1.0000 1.0000 0.6497 1.0000 0.3503 0.0000
0.0020 0.0101 0.0011 0.0188 0.4500 0.8614
0.7448 0.9103 0.7425 0.9146 0.0031 0.0047
1.0000 1.0000 0.9987 1.0000 0.0013 0.0000
0.4480 0.8983 0.4166 0.9557 0.0701 0.0639
0.3504 0.8574 0.3266 0.9183 0.0679 0.0710
1.0000 1.0000 0.9977 1.0000 0.0023 0.0000
0.9755 0.9983 0.9382 1.0000 0.0382 0.0017
0.9541 0.9873 0.4088 1.0000 0.5715 0.0129
0.0082 0.0255 0.0044 0.0478 0.4634 0.8745
0.5892 0.8616 0.5874 0.8636 0.0031 0.0023
0.3975 0.7572 0.3965 0.7652 0.0025 0.0106
0.4821 0.8061 0.1539 1.0000 0.6808 0.2405
0.7971 0.8248 0.1580 1.0000 0.8018 0.2124
0.3211 0.6884 0.1208 1.0000 0.6238 0.4526
0.3534 0.5347 0.0737 1.0000 0.7915 0.8702
0.6599 0.9591 0.2645 1.0000 0.5992 0.0426
0.9312 0.9946 0.7321 1.0000 0.2138 0.0054
0.9907 0.9996 0.6661 1.0000 0.3276 0.0004
1.0000 1.0000 0.9435 1.0000 0.0565 0.0000
0.9761 0.9977 0.4789 1.0000 0.5094 0.0023
1.0000 1.0000 0.4688 1.0000 0.5312 0.0000
0.9997 1.0000 0.9883 1.0000 0.0114 0.0000
0.9966 0.9996 0.9943 1.0000 0.0023 0.0004
0.9909 0.9992 0.9845 1.0000 0.0065 0.0008
0.0919 0.5729 0.0129 1.0000 0.8596 0.7455
0.9752 0.9957 0.9734 0.9976 0.0018 0.0019
0.9844 0.9954 0.9830 0.9968 0.0014 0.0014
Table 10: Theoretical bound, α = 0.3,  = 0.3
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el eu tl tu rl ru
0.8923 0.9970 0.8761 1.0000 0.0182 0.0030
0.8923 0.9859 0.8881 0.9887 0.0047 0.0028
0.0401 0.4469 0.0071 1.0000 0.8229 1.2376
0.6490 0.9957 0.6263 1.0000 0.0350 0.0043
0.9837 0.9991 0.4234 1.0000 0.5696 0.0009
0.1496 0.7514 0.0848 1.0000 0.4332 0.3308
0.2743 0.9445 0.2002 1.0000 0.2701 0.0588
1.0000 1.0000 0.3700 1.0000 0.6300 0.0000
0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0013 0.0000 12.0000
0.9827 0.9992 0.4039 1.0000 0.5890 0.0008
1.0000 1.0000 0.3903 1.0000 0.6097 0.0000
0.9754 0.9977 0.9588 1.0000 0.0170 0.0023
1.0000 1.0000 0.1614 1.0000 0.8386 0.0000
0.6740 0.8930 0.1609 1.0000 0.7613 0.1198
0.1595 0.7268 0.1515 0.7437 0.0502 0.0233
0.1226 0.3187 0.0188 1.0000 0.8467 2.1377
0.6020 0.9295 0.5960 0.9325 0.0100 0.0032
0.9999 1.0000 0.9968 1.0000 0.0031 0.0000
0.8062 0.9998 0.3093 1.0000 0.6163 0.0002
0.5575 0.9951 0.2491 1.0000 0.5532 0.0049
1.0000 1.0000 0.9977 1.0000 0.0023 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9808 1.0000 0.0192 0.0000
0.4195 0.9648 0.1988 1.0000 0.5261 0.0365
0.0770 0.4961 0.0353 1.0000 0.5416 1.0157
0.4003 0.8597 0.3839 0.8643 0.0410 0.0054
0.2753 0.7620 0.2582 0.7657 0.0621 0.0049
0.2977 0.9319 0.0643 1.0000 0.7840 0.0731
1.0000 1.0000 0.6587 1.0000 0.3413 0.0000
0.9266 0.9946 0.2735 1.0000 0.7048 0.0054
0.0959 0.4298 0.0086 1.0000 0.9103 1.3267
0.0070 0.0144 0.0007 0.1241 0.9000 7.6181
0.9998 1.0000 0.5942 1.0000 0.4057 0.0000
0.8747 0.9994 0.6156 1.0000 0.2962 0.0006
0.9403 0.9979 0.2950 1.0000 0.6863 0.0021
0.9908 1.0000 0.5630 1.0000 0.4318 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9093 1.0000 0.0907 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9953 1.0000 0.0047 0.0000
0.9956 0.9997 0.9926 1.0000 0.0030 0.0003
1.0000 1.0000 0.9894 1.0000 0.0106 0.0000
0.2177 0.9428 0.0836 1.0000 0.6160 0.0607
0.9607 0.9956 0.9583 0.9981 0.0025 0.0025
0.9116 0.9927 0.9080 0.9953 0.0039 0.0026
Table 11: Theoretical bound, α = 0.3,  = 0.5
36
el eu tl tu rl ru
0.0338 0.9999 0.0053 1.0000 0.8432 0.0001
1.0000 1.0000 0.9941 1.0000 0.0059 0.0000
0.0010 0.8775 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.1396
1.0000 1.0000 0.0918 1.0000 0.9082 0.0000
0.2624 0.9991 0.0090 1.0000 0.9657 0.0009
0.0014 0.7503 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3328
0.0267 0.9814 0.0169 1.0000 0.3670 0.0190
1.0000 1.0000 0.0139 1.0000 0.9861 0.0000
0.0003 0.0540 0.0000 0.6050 1.0000 10.2037
0.0008 0.9800 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0204
0.0018 0.9982 0.0001 1.0000 0.9444 0.0018
0.0008 0.9859 0.0001 1.0000 0.8750 0.0143
0.4477 0.9993 0.0745 1.0000 0.8336 0.0007
0.0013 0.8907 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.1227
0.0018 0.8922 0.0018 0.9158 0.0000 0.0265
0.0001 0.9803 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0201
0.0002 0.9997 0.0002 1.0000 0.0000 0.0003
0.0441 0.9316 0.0063 1.0000 0.8571 0.0734
0.0036 0.9116 0.0036 0.9207 0.0000 0.0100
0.0026 0.8127 0.0026 0.8213 0.0000 0.0106
0.0043 0.7365 0.0001 1.0000 0.9767 0.3578
0.0136 0.9983 0.0004 1.0000 0.9706 0.0017
1.0000 1.0000 0.9919 1.0000 0.0081 0.0000
0.0000 0.9899 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0102
0.0006 0.7868 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.2710
0.0205 0.9897 0.0101 1.0000 0.5073 0.0104
0.7058 0.9986 0.6762 1.0000 0.0419 0.0014
1.0000 1.0000 0.9938 1.0000 0.0062 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.0286 1.0000 0.9714 0.0000
0.0008 0.8034 0.0002 1.0000 0.7500 0.2447
0.2156 0.9999 0.0028 1.0000 0.9870 0.0001
0.0001 0.0288 0.0000 0.2567 1.0000 7.9132
1.0000 1.0000 0.0195 1.0000 0.9805 0.0000
0.9849 1.0000 0.0215 1.0000 0.9782 0.0000
0.0000 0.7723 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.2948
0.0030 0.8771 0.0008 1.0000 0.7333 0.1401
0.0006 0.6105 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6380
1.0000 1.0000 0.0226 1.0000 0.9774 0.0000
0.0828 0.9985 0.0815 1.0000 0.0157 0.0015
0.9025 0.9996 0.8609 1.0000 0.0461 0.0004
0.6300 0.9990 0.0088 1.0000 0.9860 0.0010
0.0000 0.5471 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.8278
0.0700 0.9957 0.0433 1.0000 0.3814 0.0043
1.0000 1.0000 0.9939 1.0000 0.0061 0.0000
Table 12: Theoretical bound, α = 0.3,  = 0.9
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el eu tl tu rl ru
0.5135 0.8608 0.5015 0.8791 0.0234 0.0213
1.0000 1.0000 0.9658 1.0000 0.0342 0.0000
0.5527 0.7848 0.5420 0.8037 0.0194 0.0241
0.5179 0.7637 0.5119 0.7670 0.0116 0.0043
0.9417 0.9860 0.9362 0.9901 0.0058 0.0042
0.9754 0.9959 0.9604 1.0000 0.0154 0.0041
0.9408 0.9859 0.9352 0.9898 0.0060 0.0040
0.9841 0.9947 0.5573 1.0000 0.4337 0.0053
0.6739 0.8326 0.6643 0.8479 0.0142 0.0184
0.7329 0.8989 0.7283 0.9034 0.0063 0.0050
1.0000 1.0000 0.9837 1.0000 0.0163 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9844 1.0000 0.0156 0.0000
0.9882 0.9984 0.6574 1.0000 0.3348 0.0016
0.6532 0.8131 0.5030 1.0000 0.2299 0.2299
1.0000 1.0000 0.9822 1.0000 0.0178 0.0000
0.9776 0.9957 0.9340 1.0000 0.0446 0.0043
0.4690 0.7447 0.4497 0.7737 0.0412 0.0389
1.0000 1.0000 0.9833 1.0000 0.0167 0.0000
0.5143 0.8600 0.4757 0.9053 0.0751 0.0527
1.0000 1.0000 0.9734 1.0000 0.0266 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9965 1.0000 0.0035 0.0000
0.9780 0.9934 0.7942 1.0000 0.1879 0.0066
0.9432 0.9844 0.9402 0.9876 0.0032 0.0033
0.9810 0.9970 0.9781 0.9999 0.0030 0.0029
1.0000 1.0000 0.9973 1.0000 0.0027 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9803 1.0000 0.0197 0.0000
0.9817 0.9979 0.9781 1.0000 0.0037 0.0021
1.0000 1.0000 0.9970 1.0000 0.0030 0.0000
0.9889 0.9959 0.6927 1.0000 0.2995 0.0041
0.2432 0.4716 0.2388 0.4790 0.0181 0.0157
0.4871 0.7217 0.4849 0.7259 0.0045 0.0058
0.9818 0.9951 0.7031 1.0000 0.2839 0.0049
0.8758 0.9746 0.8729 0.9775 0.0033 0.0030
1.0000 1.0000 0.9594 1.0000 0.0406 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9968 1.0000 0.0032 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9971 1.0000 0.0029 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9966 1.0000 0.0034 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9846 1.0000 0.0154 0.0000
0.9884 0.9975 0.7775 1.0000 0.2134 0.0025
0.9515 0.9835 0.6612 1.0000 0.3051 0.0168
Table 13: Theoretical bound, α = 1,  = 0.1
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el eu tl tu rl ru
1.0000 1.0000 0.2294 1.0000 0.7706 0.0000
0.9685 0.9970 0.8749 1.0000 0.0966 0.0030
0.9558 0.9954 0.3993 1.0000 0.5822 0.0046
0.3110 0.7573 0.2987 0.7690 0.0395 0.0154
0.8249 0.9858 0.8133 0.9925 0.0141 0.0068
0.8707 0.9914 0.8648 0.9970 0.0068 0.0056
1.0000 1.0000 0.8248 1.0000 0.1752 0.0000
0.4288 0.6541 0.1735 1.0000 0.5954 0.5288
0.4746 0.8331 0.4526 0.8722 0.0464 0.0469
1.0000 1.0000 0.5704 1.0000 0.4296 0.0000
0.9542 0.9948 0.9480 1.0000 0.0065 0.0052
1.0000 1.0000 0.9547 1.0000 0.0453 0.0000
0.9667 0.9983 0.3812 1.0000 0.6057 0.0017
0.5350 0.8141 0.2751 1.0000 0.4858 0.2284
0.9494 0.9942 0.9432 0.9999 0.0065 0.0057
0.9295 0.9951 0.7736 1.0000 0.1677 0.0049
1.0000 1.0000 0.3269 1.0000 0.6731 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9520 1.0000 0.0480 0.0000
0.2002 0.8598 0.1775 0.9668 0.1134 0.1244
1.0000 1.0000 0.9240 1.0000 0.0760 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9940 1.0000 0.0060 0.0000
0.9451 0.9935 0.5489 1.0000 0.4192 0.0065
1.0000 1.0000 0.8503 1.0000 0.1497 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9238 1.0000 0.0762 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9950 1.0000 0.0050 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9430 1.0000 0.0570 0.0000
0.9221 0.9979 0.9148 1.0000 0.0079 0.0021
1.0000 1.0000 0.9946 1.0000 0.0054 0.0000
0.3319 0.9133 0.3056 0.9611 0.0792 0.0523
0.1192 0.4611 0.1141 0.4928 0.0428 0.0687
1.0000 1.0000 0.3914 1.0000 0.6086 0.0000
0.3399 0.7526 0.3229 0.7922 0.0500 0.0526
1.0000 1.0000 0.6598 1.0000 0.3402 0.0000
0.8606 0.9863 0.8535 0.9917 0.0083 0.0055
1.0000 1.0000 0.9944 1.0000 0.0056 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9948 1.0000 0.0052 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9941 1.0000 0.0059 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9557 1.0000 0.0443 0.0000
0.4519 0.8324 0.4341 0.8677 0.0394 0.0424
1.0000 1.0000 0.4000 1.0000 0.6000 0.0000
Table 14: Theoretical bound, α = 1,  = 0.2
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el eu tl tu rl ru
1.0000 1.0000 0.1441 1.0000 0.8559 0.0000
0.7646 0.9951 0.6855 1.0000 0.1035 0.0049
0.1828 0.7830 0.1619 0.8805 0.1143 0.1245
1.0000 1.0000 0.2778 1.0000 0.7222 0.0000
0.5968 0.9854 0.5824 0.9946 0.0241 0.0093
0.6771 0.9915 0.6717 0.9991 0.0080 0.0077
0.6907 0.9935 0.5895 1.0000 0.1465 0.0065
0.6084 0.8476 0.2149 1.0000 0.6468 0.1798
0.2784 0.8261 0.2519 0.9219 0.0952 0.1160
1.0000 1.0000 0.3454 1.0000 0.6546 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.8945 1.0000 0.1055 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.8992 1.0000 0.1008 0.0000
0.9380 0.9982 0.3044 1.0000 0.6755 0.0018
0.6576 0.8583 0.1735 1.0000 0.7362 0.1651
0.8897 0.9936 0.8817 1.0000 0.0090 0.0064
0.8361 0.9957 0.4954 1.0000 0.4075 0.0043
1.0000 1.0000 0.2642 1.0000 0.7358 0.0000
0.8993 0.9954 0.8899 1.0000 0.0105 0.0046
0.0872 0.8517 0.0573 1.0000 0.3429 0.1741
1.0000 1.0000 0.8347 1.0000 0.1653 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9918 1.0000 0.0082 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.3187 1.0000 0.6813 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.6450 1.0000 0.3550 0.0000
0.7907 0.9970 0.7755 1.0000 0.0192 0.0030
1.0000 1.0000 0.9930 1.0000 0.0070 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.8734 1.0000 0.1266 0.0000
0.7618 0.9976 0.7546 1.0000 0.0095 0.0024
1.0000 1.0000 0.9925 1.0000 0.0075 0.0000
0.1313 0.9037 0.1130 1.0000 0.1394 0.1066
0.0581 0.4571 0.0521 0.5211 0.1033 0.1400
1.0000 1.0000 0.3219 1.0000 0.6781 0.0000
0.1903 0.7232 0.1671 0.8440 0.1219 0.1670
0.7592 0.9884 0.3465 1.0000 0.5436 0.0117
0.7827 0.9931 0.6737 1.0000 0.1393 0.0069
1.0000 1.0000 0.9923 1.0000 0.0077 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9927 1.0000 0.0073 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9920 1.0000 0.0080 0.0000
0.9075 0.9960 0.8983 1.0000 0.0101 0.0040
1.0000 1.0000 0.2873 1.0000 0.7127 0.0000
0.8079 0.9827 0.2896 1.0000 0.6415 0.0176
Table 15: Theoretical bound, α = 1,  = 0.3
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el eu tl tu rl ru
0.0061 0.8592 0.0056 0.8737 0.0820 0.0169
0.9184 0.9968 0.1539 1.0000 0.8324 0.0032
0.6469 0.9957 0.1377 1.0000 0.7871 0.0043
1.0000 1.0000 0.2403 1.0000 0.7597 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.1017 1.0000 0.8983 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.1441 1.0000 0.8559 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.0998 1.0000 0.9002 0.0000
0.4576 0.8415 0.1092 1.0000 0.7614 0.1884
0.0501 0.8338 0.0312 1.0000 0.3772 0.1993
1.0000 1.0000 0.1052 1.0000 0.8948 0.0000
0.6405 0.9952 0.6201 1.0000 0.0319 0.0048
0.6591 0.9956 0.6351 1.0000 0.0364 0.0044
1.0000 1.0000 0.2003 1.0000 0.7997 0.0000
0.0223 0.6743 0.0208 0.6870 0.0673 0.0188
1.0000 1.0000 0.6019 1.0000 0.3981 0.0000
0.0951 0.9886 0.0592 1.0000 0.3775 0.0115
0.8257 0.9969 0.1704 1.0000 0.7936 0.0031
1.0000 1.0000 0.6194 1.0000 0.3806 0.0000
0.0060 0.8513 0.0044 0.8659 0.2667 0.0172
0.4607 0.9871 0.4548 0.9994 0.0128 0.0125
1.0000 1.0000 0.9877 1.0000 0.0123 0.0000
0.5914 0.9933 0.0841 1.0000 0.8578 0.0067
1.0000 1.0000 0.1192 1.0000 0.8808 0.0000
0.2365 0.9965 0.2223 1.0000 0.0600 0.0035
1.0000 1.0000 0.9886 1.0000 0.0114 0.0000
0.5569 0.9943 0.5483 1.0000 0.0154 0.0057
0.2127 0.9973 0.2087 1.0000 0.0188 0.0027
1.0000 1.0000 0.9882 1.0000 0.0118 0.0000
0.0179 0.9033 0.0099 1.0000 0.4469 0.1071
0.6086 0.8170 0.1237 1.0000 0.7967 0.2240
0.0255 0.7067 0.0246 0.7323 0.0353 0.0362
1.0000 1.0000 0.1583 1.0000 0.8417 0.0000
0.5535 0.9885 0.0297 1.0000 0.9463 0.0116
0.1535 0.9862 0.1466 0.9982 0.0450 0.0122
1.0000 1.0000 0.9882 1.0000 0.0118 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9883 1.0000 0.0117 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9878 1.0000 0.0122 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.6444 1.0000 0.3556 0.0000
0.0498 0.8315 0.0343 1.0000 0.3112 0.2026
0.0853 0.6753 0.0101 1.0000 0.8816 0.4808
Table 16: Theoretical bound, α = 1,  = 0.5
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el eu tl tu rl ru
0.0000 0.8440 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.1848
0.0000 0.9937 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0063
0.0000 0.7697 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.2992
0.9999 1.0000 0.2274 1.0000 0.7726 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.0069 1.0000 0.9931 0.0000
0.0000 0.9895 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0106
1.0000 1.0000 0.0061 1.0000 0.9939 0.0000
0.0000 0.8266 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.2098
0.0011 0.9966 0.0002 1.0000 0.8182 0.0034
0.9994 1.0000 0.0952 1.0000 0.9047 0.0000
0.9962 1.0000 0.0046 1.0000 0.9954 0.0000
0.9996 1.0000 0.0042 1.0000 0.9958 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.0007 1.0000 0.9993 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.0003 1.0000 0.9997 0.0000
0.0000 0.9939 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0061
1.0000 1.0000 0.0004 1.0000 0.9996 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000
0.0007 0.9950 0.0001 1.0000 0.8571 0.0050
0.0000 0.7933 0.0000 0.9086 0.0000 0.1453
0.0000 0.9875 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0127
0.0010 1.0000 0.0004 1.0000 0.6000 0.0000
0.0000 0.8631 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.1586
0.0008 0.9937 0.0007 1.0000 0.1250 0.0063
0.0000 0.9968 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0032
1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000
0.0003 0.9946 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0054
0.0000 0.9975 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0025
0.0007 1.0000 0.0004 1.0000 0.4286 0.0000
0.0000 0.9093 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0997
0.0000 0.4311 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.3196
0.0000 0.7060 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4164
1.0000 1.0000 0.0011 1.0000 0.9989 0.0000
0.0136 0.9880 0.0005 1.0000 0.9632 0.0121
1.0000 1.0000 0.0048 1.0000 0.9952 0.0000
0.0034 1.0000 0.0024 1.0000 0.2941 0.0000
0.0007 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000
0.0008 1.0000 0.0002 1.0000 0.7500 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.0034 1.0000 0.9966 0.0000
0.0000 0.9934 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0066
0.0000 0.6810 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4684
Table 17: Theoretical bound, α = 1,  = 0.9
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el eu tl tu rl ru
0.0215 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000
0.9836 1.0000 0.0806 1.0000 0.9180 0.0000
0.9989 1.0000 0.9954 1.0000 0.0036 0.0000
0.0008 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.9996 0.0000
0.9994 1.0000 0.9964 1.0000 0.0030 0.0000
0.0013 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.9997 0.0000
0.3578 1.0000 0.0057 1.0000 0.9840 0.0000
0.9988 1.0000 0.9942 1.0000 0.0046 0.0000
0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000 0.0001 0.0000
0.9986 1.0000 0.9942 1.0000 0.0044 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0001 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.9917 0.0000
0.2877 1.0000 0.0055 1.0000 0.9809 0.0000
0.1388 1.0000 0.1050 1.0000 0.2434 0.0000
0.9971 1.0000 0.9942 1.0000 0.0029 0.0000
0.9888 1.0000 0.0837 1.0000 0.9153 0.0000
0.9978 1.0000 0.9942 1.0000 0.0036 0.0000
0.1301 1.0000 0.0995 1.0000 0.2351 0.0000
0.1535 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000
0.1465 1.0000 0.0995 1.0000 0.3211 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0191 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.9980 1.0000 0.9937 1.0000 0.0043 0.0000
0.0149 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.9999 0.0000
0.0009 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.9996 0.0000
0.1434 1.0000 0.1050 1.0000 0.2678 0.0000
0.9999 1.0000 0.9839 1.0000 0.0160 0.0000
0.9895 1.0000 0.0838 1.0000 0.9153 0.0000
0.9985 1.0000 0.9811 1.0000 0.0175 0.0000
0.1525 1.0000 0.1335 1.0000 0.1243 0.0000
0.0210 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000
0.9975 1.0000 0.9941 1.0000 0.0034 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0525 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.3927 1.0000 0.0057 1.0000 0.9854 0.0000
0.9997 1.0000 0.9811 1.0000 0.0186 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000 0.0001 0.0000
0.9998 1.0000 0.9975 1.0000 0.0022 0.0000
0.9987 1.0000 0.9941 1.0000 0.0047 0.0000
0.9870 1.0000 0.0057 1.0000 0.9942 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000 0.0001 0.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.9984 1.0000 0.9852 1.0000 0.0133 0.0000
0.1534 1.0000 0.1335 1.0000 0.1295 0.0000
0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Table 18: Theoretical bound(NLP), attack all groups,  = 0.9
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